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ABSTRACT
Robert Anderson Cochran III: SYMBOLIC VERIFICATION OF CLIENT BEHAVIOR IN
DISTRIBUTED SYSTEMS
(Under the direction of Michael K. Reiter)
A malicious client in a distributed system can undermine the integrity of the larger distributed
application in a number of different ways. For example, a server with a vulnerability may be
compromised directly by a modified client. If a client is authoritative for state in the larger distributed
application, a malicious client may transmit an altered version of this state throughout the distributed
application. A player in a networked game might cheat by modifying the client executable or the
user of a network service might craft a sequence of messages that exploit a vulnerability in a server
application. We present symbolic client verification, a technique for detecting whether network
traffic from a remote client could have been generated by sanctioned software. Our method is
based on constraint solving and symbolic execution and uses the client source code as a model for
expected behavior. By identifying possible execution paths a remote client may have followed to
generate a particular sequence of network traffic, we enable a precise verification technique that has
the benefits of requiring little to no modification to the client application and is server agnostic; the
only required inputs to the algorithm are the observed network traffic and the client source code.
We demonstrate a parallel symbolic client verification algorithm that vastly reduces verification
costs for our case study applications XPilot and TetriNET.
iii
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION
A malicious client in a distributed system can undermine the integrity of the larger distributed
application in a number of different ways. Misbehavior may be the result of a malicious user
attempting to either disrupt services or to gain advantage in a system. For example, a server
application with a vulnerability may be compromised directly by a modified client. Alternatively,
if a client is authoritative for state data in a larger distributed application, a malicious client may
transmit an illegal version of this state throughout the distributed application. Real world attacks
might consist of a player in a networked game cheating by modifying the client executable or the
user of a network service might craft a sequence of messages that exploit a vulnerability in a server
application.
There are many techniques for identifying malicious behavior in a distributed system. Some
of these methods include, for example, probabilistic models of expected traffic patterns, attack
signatures for known vulnerabilities and process level monitoring to identify control-flow attacks.
In this dissertation, however, we address the problem of identifying malicious clients through the
verification of legitimate client behaviour.
Existing techniques for verifying the correctness of client behavior in distributed applications
suffer from imprecision, increased bandwidth consumption, or significant computational expense.
One approach to defend against client misbehavior is for the server to validate client messages
using a model of client behavior derived from the sanctioned client software. For example, Giffin
et al. [38] and Guha et al. [43] developed methods to confirm that requests are consistent with
a control-flow model of the client. Unfortunately, these approaches may admit false negatives;
compromised clients that make calls consistent with their control-flow models (but that may still
manipulate application state) can escape detection, in a manner analogous to mimicry attacks on
intrusion-detection systems [86, 77]. In other work, greater precision has been achieved, but with
greater expense. For example, the Ripley system [82] replays each client on the server in order to
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Figure 1.1. Abstracted client verification problem
validate the client’s requests, but this incurs the bandwidth overhead of transmitting all client-side
inputs (user inputs, timer values, etc.) to the server to permit replay and the computational overhead
of replaying the client on the server side.
This dissertation presents a technique that resolves the tension between precision, bandwidth
consumption and computational expense with a verification technique that validates legitimate
client behavior as being consistent with the sanctioned client software. We accomplish behavior
verification without encumbering the application with substantially more bandwidth use and
without sacrificing accuracy. That is, any conclusion reached as to whether the sequence of client
behaviors could, in fact, have been produced from the sanctioned client software is correct.
1.1 Problem
The client verification problem can be abstracted as follows. A server wishes to verify that a
client is running the sanctioned software, but does so without modifying the client (e.g., by having
the client send its inputs to the server). It therefore has no direct access to client state: the server
knows only its own state and the network messages, M , that have been sent. The problem can then
be phrased as: Given a client program P, is it possible for P to yield output M? This is illustrated in
Figure 1.1.
Unfortunately, the general problem of determining whether an arbitrary program P can produce
an output M is undecidable [79]. Fortunately, even though the general problem is undecidable,
a particular instance can be tractable. The technique that we present in this dissertation is an
application of symbolic execution [12, 55], which has been widely studied and applied for various
purposes. Dynamic analysis techniques like symbolic execution typically face scaling challenges as
code complexity and execution length grow, and our case is no exception. Nevertheless, important
advances in the performance of constraint solving and symbolic execution in the recent past enable
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our methods to be viable. In this dissertation we demonstrate that symbolic execution can be used
as a foundation for verification remote client behavior.
1.2 Thesis Statement
Network messages from a remote client in a distributed system can be verified using a technique
based on symbolic execution, in some cases at a rate that keeps pace with the application, to
determine if the messages were generated by sanctioned software.
1.3 Motivation
We evaluate our framework in the context of online games. Online games provide a useful
proving ground for our techniques due to the frequent manipulation of game clients for the purposes
of cheating [93, 61, 90] and due to the pressure that game developers face to minimize the bandwidth
consumed by their games [67]. As such, our techniques are directly useful for cheat detection in
this domain. Multi-player online games are very popular and profitable and are growing more so.
Since 1996 the computer game industry has quadrupled — in 2008 alone, worldwide video-game
software sales grew 20 percent to $32 billion [63]. Estimates place revenue from online games at $11
billion, with games such as World of Warcraft, which has more than 10 million subscribers worldwide,
bringing in around $1 billion in revenue for parent company Blizzard Entertainment [1, 33].
Since its inception, the online game industry has been plagued by cheating of numerous types,
in some cases with financial repercussions to the game operator. Age of Empires and America’s Army
are examples of online games that suffered substantial player loss due to cheating [75], and for
subscription games, player loss translates directly to a reduction in revenue. Game developers and
operators are not the only ones for whom the stakes are high. Hoglund and McGraw [46] argue
that “games are a harbinger of software security issues to come,” suggesting that defenses against
game cheats and game-related security problems will be important techniques for securing future
massive distributed systems of other types.
The defense that we propose in this dissertation addresses a class of malicious behavior that
Webb and Soh term invalid commands:
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Usually implemented by modifying the game client, the invalid command cheat results in the
cheater sending commands that are not possible with an unmodified game client. Examples
include giving the cheater’s avatar great strength or speed. This may also be implemented by
modifying the game executable or data files. Many games suffer this form of cheating, including
console games such as Gears of War. [90, Section 4.2.3]
Our technique will detect commands that are invalid in light of the history of the client’s
previous behaviors witnessed by the server, even if those commands could have been valid in
some other execution. Simply put, our approach will detect any client message sequence that is
impossible to observe from the sanctioned client software.
1.4 Contributions
The key contributions of this dissertation are:
• A novel technique, symbolic client verification, that can verify the behavior of a remote client by
determining whether a sequence of messages from a remote client could have been generated
by sanctioned software.
• An extension of symbolic client verification to optimize identification of legitimate clients that
uses training data to improve performance.
• A parallel algorithm for symbolic client verification that significantly improves performance.
• Evaluations of symbolic client verification in the framework of online games on a game of our
own design, called Cap-Man, and two real-world games, XPilot and TetriNET.
The rest of this dissertation is outlined as follows. Chapter 2 gives an overview of symbolic exe-
cution and related work. Chapter 3 introduces symbolic client verification along with an evaluation
in the context of online games. Chapter 3 is based on work that appears in the proceedings of the
17th ISOC Network and Distributed System Security Symposium [8] and in the ACM Transactions
on Information and System Security [9]. Chapter 4 presents an optimistic version of symbolic
client verification that prioritizes legitimate clients and also provides an evaluation. Chapter 4 is
based on work published in the proceedings of the 20th ISOC Network and Distributed System
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Security Symposium [26]. Chapter 5 presents a parallel algorithm for symbolic client verification
and demonstrates the improvements it provides with an evaluation on verification of legitimate
client in the context of online games. Portions of Chapter 5 have been published in a technical
report [22]. Chapter 6 concludes the dissertation.
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CHAPTER 2: BACKGROUND AND RELATED WORK
In this dissertation we use the analysis of source code to develop a model of client behavior,
against which messages from the client are checked by a verifier. In this chapter we place our
proposed methods in the wider context of security and verification methods by describing related
work and background information. We start with an overview of cheating in online games and
specific methods for detecting malicious behavior in such environments. We then give an overview
of existing techniques for the detection of remote client misbehavior in the general case. While this
dissertation places an emphasis on online games, it is useful to understand our contributions in the
context of other verification methods; so we give an overview of verification methods in distributed
systems and the emerging field of verifiable computing. Finally, we give background information
on symbolic execution, which serves as the foundation for the proposals in the following chapters.
2.1 Detecting and Preventing Misbehavior in Online Games
As long as humans have played games, there have been players that have wished to cheat; and
as long as there have been cheaters, players have devised methods to prevent or detect this cheating.
One of the earliest examples of a cheat prevention method existed over 2000 years ago. In Ancient
Rome, many games were based on dice and those who wished to keep players honest used a device
to prevent the dice thrower from influencing the result [59]. The pyxis cornea was a table-top sized
“tower” for rolling dice fairly; the dice were placed into an open funnel at the top and rolled down a
internal staircase until exiting onto the table. Games of the modern era are much more complicated
than those of Ancient Rome but the tension between honest players and cheating players still exists.
Modern techniques for the detection and prevention of malicious behavior in online games
come in many varieties. In practice however, methods consist largely of client-side monitoring and
server-side heuristics which are potentially incomplete, manually programmed and effort-intensive.
Commenting on the issues developers face, game consultant Hawkins states:
Players love to cheat — especially in online games ... be ready to add server-side support to
prevent user cheating with methods that you were not able to predict. [45]
We now give an overview of the techniques developers and researchers have investigated for the
detection and prevention of malicious behavior in online games and how they relate to the proposals
of this dissertation. For more information on this area, a number of authors have conducted surveys
on the problem of of cheating in online games: Yan and Randell [93], Lyhyaoui et al. [61], and Webb
and Soh [90].
Monitoring
One common approach to defeat a variety of cheats involves augmenting the client-side com-
puter with monitoring functionality to perform cheat detection (e.g., PunkBuster, World of Warcraft’s
Warden, Valve’s VAC [81] and [30, 31, 53, 66, 71]). Such approaches require consideration of how
to defend this functionality from tampering, and some commercial examples have met with re-
sistance from the user community. Accusations of client-side monitoring that violates standard
expectations for player privacy have been levied against both Warden [89] and VAC [13]. These
systems aggressively ban users that trigger cheat detection monitoring; Valve’s VAC has banned
over 2 million player accounts [76]. However, the systems do have false positives; in 2010, Valve
erroneously banned 12,000 players [64]. In contrast, our approach does not rely on monitoring
functionality being added to clients and does not have false positives.
Bot Detection
Other work focuses on wholly different cheats than we consider in this dissertation. One example
is game “bots” that perform certain repetitive or precise tasks in place of human gamers [19, 71, 92,
20, 65]. Bots that utilize the sanctioned game client to do so (as many do) will go undetected by our
scheme, since the client behavior as seen by the server could have been performed by the sanctioned
game client on inputs from a real human user (albeit an especially skilled or patient one).
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Network Manipulation
Another cheat that has received significant attention occurs when clients delay or suppress
reporting (and choosing) their own actions for a game step until after learning what others have
chosen in that step (e.g., [4, 29]). Such attacks can also go unnoticed by our techniques, if such
delay or suppression could be explained by factors (e.g., network congestion) other than client
modification. Our techniques are compatible with all proposed defenses of which we are aware for
network delay suppression and so can be used together with them.
Peer-to-Peer Auditing
Finally, various works have examined security specifically for peer-to-peer games, e.g., using
peer-based auditing [41, 49, 52]. Our technique may be applicable in some peer-to-peer auditing
schemes, but we focus on the client-server setting in this dissertation.
2.2 Detecting Remote Client Misbehavior in the General Case
Detecting the misbehavior of remote clients in a client-server application is an area that has
received considerable attention outside the domain of online games. We now expand our scope to
examine methods for detecting remote client misbehavior in all types of networked software.
Model-based Verification
The proposals of this dissertation are a special case of model-based verification, a strategy where
a model of proper client behavior is constructed and then compared against actual client behaviors.
Giffin et al. [38] developed such an approach for validating remote system calls back to home server
from potentially untrusted remote machines. In that work, remote system calls are compared to
a control flow model generated from the binary code of the outsourced computation, specifically
either a non-deterministic finite-state automaton or a push-down automaton that mirrors the flow
of control in the executable. Later work by the same authors takes a more precise approach with a
model-based intrusion detection method that uses context-sensitive Dyck models [37]. Another
example is work by Guha et al. [43]: through static analysis of the client portion of web applications
(HTML and JavaScript), their system constructs a control-flow graph for the client that describes
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the sequences of URLs that the client-side program can invoke. Any request that does not conform
to this graph is then flagged as potentially malicious. Other works [10, 74] address parameter
tampering attacks in web forms by using server-side proxies to infer a parameter constraint model
when a web form is served to a client. Each client request using the web form is checked against the
parameter model.
The techniques we propose in this dissertation follow a similar paradigm to the above ap-
proaches. We use analysis (in our case, of source code) to develop a model of client behavior, against
which inputs (messages from the client) are compared. Unfortunately, compromised clients that
make calls consistent with control-flow models may still manipulate application state [21] and can
escape detection, in a manner analogous to mimicry attacks on intrusion-detection systems [86, 77].
The primary differentiator of our approach from these previous works is soundness: only sequences
of client messages that could have actually been produced through valid client execution, on the
inputs sent by the server, will be accepted. This precision is accomplished though our use of sym-
bolic execution (described below in Section 2.5) to derive the complete implications of each message
value to the client-side state. While this would hardly be tractable for any arbitrary client-server
application, the control-loop structure of many clients that have frequent communication with the
server can bound the amount of uncertainty that the verifier faces in checking the client’s messages.
Authoritative State
A different approach to protecting against client misbehavior in client-server settings is to ensure
that clients manage no authoritative state that could affect the server or the larger application. A
system for implementing web applications to have this property is Swift [25]. The extreme of
this approach is for the client to simply forward all unseen inputs (e.g., user inputs) to the server,
where a trusted copy of the client-side computation acts on these inputs directly; e.g., this is
implemented for web applications in the Ripley system [82]. In contrast, our approach detects any
client behavior that is inconsistent with legal client execution, without requiring that all low-level
events be sent to the server. Our approach represents a middle ground in terms of programmer effort
between automatic partitioning, which can require extensive manual annotation of the program [25],
and client replication on the server, which requires less programmer effort, but more bandwidth
to forward all inputs and greater server-side computation. Another consideration of moving all
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authoritative state to the server is that it is known to increase the bandwidth consumed by interactive
applications owing to the need for every access to authoritative state to reach the server (e.g., [67,
p. 112]).
Auditing
If the preceding approach can be viewed as a “pessimistic” way of eliminating trust in the client
to manage authoritative state, one might say an “optimistic” version was proposed by Jha et al. [50].
Instead of moving authoritative state to a trusted server, a trusted audit server probabilistically audits
the management of authoritative state at the client. In this approach, each client periodically commits
to its complete state by sending a cryptographic hash of it to the audit server. If later challenged by
the audit server, the client turns over the requested committed state and all information (client-to-
server and server-to-client updates, user inputs) needed to re-trace and validate the client’s behavior
between this state and the next committed state. This approach, however, introduces additional
costs to the client in the form of increased computation to cryptographically hash client state, storage
to retain the information needed to respond to an audit, and bandwidth to transmit that information
in the event of an audit. Our approach introduces no additional client-side computation, client-side
storage or client-server bandwidth. Moreover, verification of clients in this scheme must be done
during an active session, since clients cannot retain the needed information forever. In contrast, our
approach supports auditing at any time in the future by the server operator, provided that it records
the needed messages (to which it already has access).
2.3 Verifying Distributed Systems
While the verification of client behavior in the domain of online games was the initial motivation
for the work in this dissertation, we argue that the proposed methods for verifying remote client
misbehavior can be the first step in a framework for behavior verification in a larger class of
distributed systems. Furthermore, the challenges of combating faulty or misbehaving nodes in
distributed systems encompasses the challenges found in client-server systems but with increased
complexity due the immense number of conditions that can arise due to asynchrony and partial
failures. In this section, we place our behavior verification technique in the wider context of
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methods for testing and verifying distributed system implementations and behaviours. A key
distinction to note is that in this dissertation we are not checking a model of the overall client-server
implementation or formally verifying the implementation. Our proposals are concerned with
verifying observed network behavior received from the client against a model derived from the
client source code.
Model Checking
Model checking is a state space exploration method that can be used to enumerate all states
or paths in a system for the purposes of verifying properties or specifications. Surveys on recent
advances in software model checking are due to Jhala et al. [51] and Be´rard et al [6]. As mentioned
above, our methods are related to model checking in that we use the client source code itself
as a model for client behavior. Many advances in model checking have addressed the scaling
challenges introduced as the space of possible configurations or states increases. In distributed
systems this scaling challenge is particularly acute. Nevertheless, model checking approaches
have been used to validate distributed system implementations. For example, the MODIST [94]
system allows discovery of bugs or errors in unmodified binaries via an OS-level interposition layer
that introduces all network or environmental actions in a distributed system. The model checking
engine uses several search strategies to explore possible states which are instantiated by replaying
actions. The OS-level interposition layer and heuristic search approach of MODIST is similar to
our methods of behavior verification. However, unlike our techniques, MODIST has no notion of
symbolic actions and thus the error conditions can only be triggered if the model checking engine
introduces the appropriate sequence of actions. Another approach, MACE [54], uses a high level
language with primitives that impose restrictions and structure on how a distributed system can be
written, while still allowing for efficient model checking at a high level. In contrast, our methods
operate on pre-existing software. The above systems integrate model checking into the testing and
development stages of distributed system design, while our proposed techniques observe and verify
runtime behavior, namely the outputs of the client software as received by the verifier. Pip [69] is a
system that also allows for the verification of runtime behavior in a distributed system but differs
from our work in that it requires the developers to define a specification for expected behavior, our
work uses the client source code itself as the behavior model.
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Software Verification
Recently, mechanically verified implementations of distributed systems have proven to be more
robust and safe than ad-hoc implementations with accompanying hand-written proofs of correctness
(e.g., for Byzantine fault tolerance algorithms [58] or for the Chord distributed hash table [99]).
Systems for implementing formally verified software been built using domain-specific languages
that enable formal verification, such as the Coq [7] interactive proof assistant and the TLA+ [57]
proof specification system. These implementations include OS kernels [42], components of web
browsers [70] and distributed protocols (e.g., Verdi [91] and IronFleet [44]). In this dissertation we
do not formally verify the overall client-server implementation itself for fault tolerance and liveness,
but rather use the implementation of the remote software to verify observed network behavior.
Our techniques are, in theory, compatible with existing methods for verifying distributed systems,
and may provide additional security properties. The guarantees above are only as good as the
assumptions made about the types of faults that may occur; some work formally verifies software
under general network or system errors, but leaves out consideration of targeted attacks.
2.4 Verifiable Computation
The recent growth of cloud services and mobile devices has motivated research into the de-
velopment of techniques for checking the correctness of results provided by an untrusted cloud
service. This domain is related to the client behavior verification problem, but in reverse; a compu-
tationally weak client wishes to oﬄoad computation to a remote server or entity. The remote server
however may return an incorrect result because of a fault or error, or there may be an incentive
for the server to cheat by either not performing a costly computation or returning a result that is
somehow beneficial to the server. The study of verifiable computation is concerned with verifying
that the result of some computation, performed by a cloud service or remote client, is provably
correct. Before the field of verifiable computation was formalized, early solutions for ensuring the
integrity of outsourced computation did so via replication. The SETI@home [3] project outsources
computational work for analysis of astronomical data and uses redundant computation on different
clients to identify results that may be erroneous or malicious. Ideally, however, the outsourced work
would be verified at a cost that is smaller than performing the outsourced computation itself. A
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scheme for verifiable computation using abstractions from the theory of computation was first in-
troduced by Generro et. al [35]. They defined a scheme that is a combination of fully homomorphic
encryption [36] and Yao’s garbled circuits [96]. While impractical, this work showed that verifiable
computation is achievable. Other work has improved this scheme, allowing for the outsourced task
to be represented in a high level language that is transformed into an arithmetic circuit [68, 85, 5].
Others use advances in interactive proofs [40] or probabilistically checkable proofs [48] to permit
a verifier to probabilistically confirm that an outsourced computation was performed correctly.
Verifiable computing has been studied in under several different assumptions and client-server
configurations; including, multi-client outsourcing [24], computations on encrypted data [32] and
biometric computations [11]. Walfish et al. [87] provide a useful survey of several approaches to
verifiable computation with performance and implementation comparisons.
There are several key differences between the solutions found in the area of verifiable com-
putation and the proposals of this dissertation. While some improvements have been made (e.g.,
Pinocchio [68]), current systems for verifiable computation induce significant overhead on the client
and must be implemented in specialized languages to allow transformation into an arithmetic
circuit representation. Such transformations can induce an increase in the representation size that is
exponential in the size of the input if the task contains a large number of loops or memory accesses.
Our proposals do not induce any additional overhead on the client and can be implemented in any
language that can be complied into a byte-code representation supported by the verifier (in our case,
C). Secondly, while the techniques of verifiable computing could be generalized into supporting a
wide variety of client-server applications, current verifiable computation systems would require
existing implementations to be rewritten. Our technique supports several classes of applications
without any changes to preexisting message format and frequency.
2.5 Symbolic Execution
Symbolic execution was introduced in the 1970’s [12, 55], but it has only recently become a
practical and viable software tool. At a high level, symbolic execution is a way of “executing” a
program while exploring all execution paths, for example to find bugs in the program. Symbolic
execution works by executing the software with its initial inputs specially marked so they are
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allowed to be “anything” — the memory regions of the input are marked as symbolic and are not
given any initial value. The program is executed step-by-step, building constraints on the symbolic
variables based on the program’s operations on those variables. For example, if the program sets
a ← b + c, where a, b, and c are all marked as symbolic, then after the operation, there will be a
new logical constraint on the value of a that states that it must equal the sum of b and c. When the
program conditionally branches on a symbolic value, execution forks and both program branches
are followed, with the true branch forming a constraint that the symbolic value evaluates to true
and the false branch forming the opposite constraint. Using this strategy, symbolic execution can
follow every possible code path in the target program, building a constraint for each one that must
hold on execution of that path. Symbolic execution can help locate software bugs, for example, by
providing constraints that enable a constraint solver to generate concrete inputs that cause errors to
occur. Specifically, if execution reaches an error condition (or a state thought to be “impossible”),
then a constraint solver can use the constraints associated with that path to solve for a concrete
input value that triggers the error condition. Having a concrete input that reliably reproduces an
error is a great help when trying to correct the bug in the source code.
Applications for Security
Symbolic execution has seen significant interest in the security community for generating vul-
nerability signatures [14, 28], generating inputs that will induce error conditions [18, 95], automating
mimicry attacks [56], and optimizing privacy-preserving computations [88], to name a few. The
approach that we take to the behavior verification problem in this dissertation is an application of
symbolic execution. In our case, we symbolically execute the client software with client-side inputs
unknown to the server marked symbolic and then determine whether the messages received from
the client violate the postconditions derived from the software.
Applications for Software Testing
Among applications of symbolic execution, software testing has received the most research
attention. Symbolic execution can be an effective method of increasing the degree of code coverage
in a testing tool by generating test cases that cover a high percentage of paths in a program. For
example, DART [39] first concretely executes a program with an arbitrary input, recording the
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path constraint implied by its choice at each branch point. The path constraint is then modified
by negating a clause and a satisfying assignment to the constraint is found to derive a new input
that will cover a different path in the program. More recent examples of this approach, which is
also called concolic execution, include CUTE [72], JPF [84] and Pex [78, 2]. In contrast, our approach
expands the verifier’s search for paths to explain client messages as needed, starting from an initial
collection of paths, but it does so without solving for inputs to exercise a path concretely and
without the goal of achieving high path coverage.
Applications for Debugging
The applications of symbolic execution that are most related to our own are in debugging
and diagnostics. Zamfir et al. [98] developed a debugging tool that uses symbolic execution to
reconstruct the likely path a program took before it crashed, from the core dump file recorded
by the operating system when the crash occurred. Their technique finds a feasible path or set of
paths through a program that allow the program to reach the memory and process state that the
core dump file indicates. SherLog [97] is another error diagnosis tool that uses a log file instead
of a core dump file to indicate how a program executed. SherLog performs path analysis (not
symbolic execution per se, but a similar technique) to determine the likely execution paths and
variable values implied by a given set of log files. Similarly, symbolic execution has been used
to discover the constraints for the paths through a program that reaches a vulnerability or error
condition [14, 16, 18, 95]. Viewed through the lens of our work, the core dump file, log file, or error
condition in these previous works is analogous to a “client message”, and these tools similarly
seek to find an execution that could explain it. However, the structure of our verification task —
namely successively building an execution path to explain an entire sequence of messages — and
the performance demands that we seek to meet give rise to a technique which we believe to be
novel.
Parallel Symbolic Execution
In Chapter 5, we propose a method for behavior verification that is built upon a thread-level
parallel extension to the klee [17] symbolic execution framework. Other efforts have demonstrated
the feasibility and performance benefits of parallelized symbolic execution engines [15, 73, 62].
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Bucur et al. demonstrated a parallelization approach that divides the symbolic execution work
across multiple processes or worker nodes. In contrast, we propose a shared memory design,
rather than a message passing approach, that has several advantages for the application of behavior
verification. A shared memory approach better leverages opportunities to make symbolic execution
optimizations that include: identification of duplicate states, utilization of symbolic state merging
and shared constraint solving structures. Furthermore, during load-balancing in the Bucur et al.
method, symbolic execution tasks are re-executed rather than transferred between processes. For
testing at scale, the overhead of this redundant work is reasonable, but not for our unique application
of symbolic execution. Additionally, our shared memory approach uses global knowledge of the
progress of each execution path under consideration to make more informed decisions about which
execution paths to explore next.
16
CHAPTER 3: SYMBOLIC CLIENT VERIFICATION
In this chapter we demonstrate a technique to detect any type of client modification that causes
the client to exhibit behavior, as seen by the server, that is inconsistent with the sanctioned client
software and the game state known at the server. That is, our approach discerns whether there
was any possible sequence of user inputs to the sanctioned client software that could have given rise
to each message received at the server, given what the server knew about the game client based
on previous messages from the client and the messages the server sent to the client. In doing so,
our approach remedies the previously heuristic and manual construction of server-side checks.
Moreover, our approach potentially enables new client designs that reduce bandwidth use by
placing more authoritative state at the client, since our approach verifies that the client’s behavior
is consistent with legal management of that state. While reducing interaction with the client will
generally increase the computational cost of our verification, verification need not be done on the
critical path and can be performed selectively (e.g., only for randomly selected or suspicious users).
Our strategy exploits the fact that clients are often structured as an event loop that processes
user inputs, server messages, or other events in the context of current client state and then sends an
update to the server on the basis of its processing. We symbolically execute the loop to derive a
predicate that characterizes the effects of the loop, and specifically the update sent to the server, as
a function of its inputs and game state. By partially instantiating these predicates on the basis of the
actual messages the server receives from a client and what the server previously sent to the client, a
verifier can then use a constraint solver to determine whether the resulting predicate is satisfiable. If
so, then the messages are consistent with proper client execution — i.e., there were some user inputs
that could have yielded these messages.
We demonstrate our approach with three case studies on online games. First, we apply our
technique to the open-source game XPilot. Because XPilot was developed as is commonplace today,
i.e., with low-level client events being sent to the server, this case study does not fully illustrate
the strengths of our approach. However, it does demonstrate the (few) ways in which we found it
necessary to adapt XPilot to use our technique efficiently. For the second case study, we use a game
of our own design that is similar to Pac-Man but that has features to better exercise our technique.
Third, we utilize TetriNET, a multiplayer version of Tetris, to demonstrate the potential bandwidth
savings that symbolic client verification can enable. Together, these case studies illustrate the limits
and benefits of our approach and serve as a foundation for future work.
Following our initial investigation of these case studies, we investigate the impact of message
loss on our verification technique. We extend our technique to improve verification performance in
the face of message loss on the network. We then evaluate this extension using XPilot, since it is
an example of a game built to use an unreliable transport protocol for performance reasons and
consequently to continue operation despite message loss.
3.1 Goals, Assumptions and Limitations
Importantly, our technique will even detect commands that are invalid in light of the history of
the client’s previous behaviors witnessed by the server, even if those commands could have been
valid in some other execution. Simply put, our approach will detect any client message sequence
that is impossible to observe from the sanctioned client software.
As we present and evaluate our approach, it requires access to source code for the client, though
potentially a similar approach could be developed with access to only the executable. The approach
should be attractive to developers because it can save them significant effort in implementing
customized server-side verification of client behaviors. Our approach is comprehensive and largely
automatic; in our case study described in Section 3.3, we needed only modest adaptations to an
existing open-source game.
In order for detection to be efficient, our technique depends on certain assumptions about the
structure of the client. We assume in this dissertation that the client is structured as a loop that
processes inputs (user inputs, or messages from the server) and that updates the server about certain
aspects of its status that are necessary (e.g., the client’s current location on a game map, so that the
server can update other players in the game with that location). Updates from the client to the server
need not be in exact one-to-one correspondence to loop iterations. However, as the number of loop
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iterations that execute without sending updates increases, the uncertainty in the verifier’s “model”
of the client state also generally increases. This increase will induce greater server-side computation
in verifying that future updates from the client are consistent with past ones. As we will see in
Section 3.3, it is useful for these updates from the client to indicate which server-to-client messages
the client has received, but importantly, the information sent by the client need not include the
user inputs or a full account of its relevant state. Indeed, it is this information that a client would
typically send today and that we permit the client to omit in our approach.
Due to the scope of what it tries to detect, however, our technique has some limitations that are
immediately evident. First, our technique will not detect cheats that are permitted by the sanctioned
client software due to bugs. Second, modifications to the client that do not change its behavior
as seen at the server will go unnoticed by our technique. For example, any action that is possible
to perform will be accepted, and so cheating by modifying the client program to make difficult
(but possible) actions easy will go undetected. Put in a more positive light, however, this means
that our technique has no false alarms, assuming that symbolic execution successfully explores all
paths through the client. As another example, a client modification that discloses information to
the player that should be hidden, e.g., such as a common cheat that uncovers parts of the game map
that should be obscured, will go unnoticed by our technique. In the limit, a user could write their
own version of the client from scratch and still go undetected, provided that the behaviors it emits,
as witnessed by the server, are a subset of those that the sanctioned client software could emit.
3.2 Client Verification Approach
Our detection mechanism analyzes client output (as seen by the server) and determines whether
that output could in fact have been produced by a valid client. Toward that end, a key step of our
approach is to profile the client’s source code using symbolic execution and then use the results in
our analysis of observed client outputs. We begin with an application of symbolic execution; shown
in our context in Section 3.2.1–Section 3.2.4. The symbolic execution engine that we use in our work
is klee [17], with some modifications to make it more suitable for our task.
Before we continue, we clarify our use of certain terminology. Below, when we refer to a valid
client, we mean a client that faithfully executes a sanctioned client program (and does not interfere
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with its behavior). Values or messages are then valid if they could have been emitted by a valid
client.
At a high level, the symbolic client verification technique works by generating postconditions
for all of the paths through key event loops in the client application, and then during verification,
constructing chains of postconditions in combination with the message trace we are verifying. If
the complete postcondition chain is satisfiable, then the message trace could have been produced
by a legitimate client. The computational expense required for this method of verification lends it
to be useful primarily in an oﬄine fashion and only after modifying test applications to constrain
the search spaces they present.
3.2.1 Generating Round Constraints
The first step of our technique is identifying the main event loop of the game client and all of
its associated client state, which should include any global memory, memory that is a function
of the client input, and memory that holds data received from the network. These state variables
are then provided to the symbolic execution tool, which is used to generate a constraint for each
path through the loop in a single round. These constraints are thus referred to as round constraints.
Round constraints consist of three classes of symbolic variables: state variables, input variables and
network variables.
Toy Example
For example, consider the toy game client in Figure 3.1(a). This client reads a keystroke from
the user and either increments or decrements the value of the location variable loc based on this
key. The new location value is then sent to the server, and the client loops to read a new key from
the user. Although this example is a toy, one can imagine it forming the basis for a Pong client.
To prepare for symbolic execution, we modify the program slightly, as shown in Figure 3.1(b).
First, we initialize the variable key not with a concrete input value read from the user (line 4) but
instead as an unconstrained symbolic variable (line 4). We then replace the instruction to send
output to the server (line 11) with a breakpoint in the symbolic execution (line 12). Finally, we create
a new symbolic state variable, prev loc (line 1), which will represent the game state up to this point
in the execution. The state variable loc will be initialized to this previous state (line 2).
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1: loc← 0;
2:
3: while true do
4: key ← readkey();
5: if key = ESC then
6: endgame();
7: else if key = ‘↑’ then
8: loc← loc+ 1;
9: else if key = ‘↓’ then
10: loc← loc− 1;
11: sendlocation(loc);
(a) Toy game client
1: prev loc← symbolic;
2: loc← prev loc;
3: while true do
4: key ← symbolic;
5: if key = ESC then
6: endgame();
7: else if key = ‘↑’ then
8: loc← loc+ 1;
9: else if key = ‘↓’ then
10: loc← loc− 1;
11: msg ← loc
12: breakpoint;
(b) Symbolically instrumented toy game client
Figure 3.1. Example game client
Symbolically executing one loop iteration of this modified program, we see that there are four
possible paths that the client could take in any given round. In the first possible path, key is ESC,
and the game ends. Note that this branch never reaches the breakpoint. The second and third
possible paths are taken when key is equal to ‘↑’ and ‘↓’, respectively. The final path is taken when
key is none of the aforementioned keys. These last three paths all terminate at the breakpoint.
Via symbolic execution, the verifier can obtain the constraints for all symbolic variables at
the time each path reached the breakpoint. Because we artificially created prev loc during the
instrumentation phase, it remains an unconstrained symbolic variable in all three cases. The state
variable loc, however, is constrained differently on each of the three paths. In the case when key
is equal to ‘↑’, symbolic execution reports loc = prev loc + 1 as the only constraint on loc. When
key is equal to ‘↓’, the constraint is that loc = prev loc− 1. And when key is not ‘↑’, ‘↓’, or ESC, the
constraint is that loc = prev loc.
Therefore, there are three possible paths that can lead to a message being sent to the server. If
the server receives a message from a client — and the client is a valid client — then the client must
have taken one of these three paths. Since each path introduces a constraint on the value of loc
as a function of its previous value, the verifier can take the disjunction of these constraints, along
with the current and previous values of loc (which the server already knows) and see if they are
all logically consistent. That is, the verifier can check to see if the change in values for loc match
up to a possible path that a valid game client might have taken. If so, then this client is behaving
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according to the rules of a valid game client. The disjunction of round constraints in this case is:
(loc = prev loc+ 1) ∨ (loc = prev loc− 1) ∨ (loc = prev loc) (3.1)
For example, suppose the verifier knows that the client reported on its previous turn that its loc
was 8. If the client were to then report its new location as loc = 9, the verifier could simply check to
see if the following is satisfiable:
(prev loc = 8) ∧ (loc = 9) ∧
[(loc = prev loc+ 1) ∨ (loc = prev loc− 1) ∨ (loc = prev loc)]
Of course, it is satisfiable, meaning that the new value loc = 9 could in fact have been generated by
a valid game client. Suppose, though, that in the next turn, the client reports his new position at
loc = 12. Following the same algorithm, the verifier would check the satisfiability of
(prev loc = 9) ∧ (loc = 12) ∧
[(loc = prev loc+ 1) ∨ (loc = prev loc− 1) ∨ (loc = prev loc)]
Because these round constraints are not satisfiable, no valid game client could have produced the
message loc = 12 (in this context). Therefore, the verifier can safely conclude that the sender of that
message is running an incompatible game client — is cheating.
There are also constraints associated with the variable key. We have omitted these here for
clarity, showing only the constraints on loc. We have also omitted the constraints generated by the
preamble of the loop, which in this case are trivial (“loc = 0”) but in general would be obtained by
applying symbolic execution to the preamble separately. Had there been any random coin flips
or reading of the current time, the variables storing the results would also have been declared
symbolic, and constraints generated accordingly. While file input (e.g., configuration files) could
also be declared symbolic, in this disseration we generally assume that such input files are known
to the verifier (e.g., if necessary, sent to the server at the beginning of game play) and so treat these
as concrete.
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3.2.2 Accumulating Constraints
While the branches taken by a client in each round may not be visible to the verifier, the verifier
can keep a set of constraints that represent possible client executions so far. Specifically, the verifier
forms a conjunction of round constraints that represents a sequence of possible paths through
the client’s loop taken over multiple rounds; we call this conjunction an accumulated constraint and
denote the set of satisfiable accumulated constraints at the end of round i by C i. This set corresponds
to the possible paths taken by a client through round i.
The verifier updates a given set C i−1 of accumulated constraints upon receiving a new client
message msg i in round i. To do so, the verifier first combines the values given in msg i with each
round constraint for round i, where each symbolic variable in the round constraint represents client
state for round i, and the round constraint characterizes those variables as a function of the variables
for round i− 1. The verifier then combines each result with each accumulated constraint in C i−1
and checks for satisfiability.
For example, let us parameterize the round constraints for the toy example in Section 3.2.1 with
the round number j:
G(j) = { locj = locj−1 + 1 , locj = locj−1 − 1 , locj = locj−1 }
Note that each member of G(j) corresponds to a disjunct in (3.1). If in round i = 2 the server
receives the message msg2 = 9 from the client, then it generates the constraint M = “loc2 = 9”,
because the value “9” in the message represents information corresponding to the variable loc in
the client code. Then, combining M with each G ∈ G(2) gives the three constraints:
loc2 = 9 ∧ loc2 = loc1 + 1
loc2 = 9 ∧ loc2 = loc1 − 1
loc2 = 9 ∧ loc2 = loc1
Note that the combination of the client message with each round constraint involves both instantia-
tion (e.g., using j = 2 above) as well as including the specific values given in the client message at
that round (i.e., loc2 = 9 above).
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Algorithm Symbolic Client Verification
1: procedure verify(msg i, C i−1)
2: C i ← ∅
3: M← msgToConstraint(msg i)
4: for G ∈ G(i) do
5: for C ∈ C i−1 do
6: C′ ← C ∧ G ∧M
7: if isSatisfiable(C′) then
8: C i ← C i ∪ {C′}
Figure 3.2. Construction of C i from C i−1 and msg i
These three round constraints each represent a possible path the client might have taken in the
second round. The verifier must therefore consider each of them in turn as if it were the correct
path. For example, if C 1 = {loc1 = 8}, then the verifier can use each round constraint to generate
the following possible accumulated constraints:
loc1 = 8 ∧ [loc2 = 9 ∧ loc2 = loc1 + 1]
loc1 = 8 ∧ [loc2 = 9 ∧ loc2 = loc1 − 1]
loc1 = 8 ∧ [loc2 = 9 ∧ loc2 = loc1]
Since the second and third constraints are not satisfiable, however, this reduces to
C 2 = {loc1 = 8 ∧ [loc2 = 9 ∧ loc2 = loc1 + 1]}
= {loc1 = 8 ∧ loc2 = 9}
The basic algorithm for constructing C i from C i−1 and msg i is thus as shown in Figure 3.2. In
this figure, msgToConstraint simply translates a message to the constraint representing what values
were sent in the message. It is important to note that while |C i| = 1 for each i in our toy example,
this will not generally be the case for a more complex game. In another game, there might be many
accumulated constraints represented in C i−1, each of which would have to be extended with the
possible new round constraints to produce C i.
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3.2.3 Constraint Pruning
Every accumulated constraint in C i is a conjunction C = c1∧ . . .∧cn (or can be written as one, in
conjunctive normal form). In practice, constraints can grow very quickly. Even in the toy example of
the previous section, the accumulated constraint in C 2 has one more conjunct than the accumulated
constraint in C 1. As such, the verifier must take measures to avoid duplicate constraint checking
and to reduce the size of accumulated constraints.
First, the verifier partitions the conjuncts of each new accumulated constraint C′ (line 6) based
on variables (e.g., loc2) referenced by its conjuncts. Specifically, consider the undirected graph in
which each conjunct ck in C′ is represented as a node and the edge (ck, ck′) exists if and only if there
is a variable that appears in both ck and ck′ . Then, each connected component of this graph defines
a block in the partition of C′. Because no two blocks for C′ share variable references, the verifier can
check each block for satisfiability independently (line 7), and each block is smaller, making each
such check more efficient. And, since some accumulated constraints C′ will share conjuncts, caching
proofs of satisfiability for previously-checked blocks will allow shared blocks to be confirmed as
satisfiable more efficiently.
Second, because round constraints refer only to variables in two consecutive rounds — i.e., any
G ∈ G(j) refers only to variables for round j and j − 1 — the formulas G and M in line 6 will refer
only to variables in rounds i and i− 1. Therefore, if there are blocks of conjuncts for C′ in line 6 that
contain no references to variables for round i, then these conjuncts cannot be rendered unsatisfiable
in future rounds. Once the verifier determines that this block of conjuncts is satisfiable (line 7), it
can safely remove the conjuncts in that block from C′.
3.2.4 Server Messages
Round constraints are not a function of only user inputs (and potentially random coin flips and
time readings) but also of messages from the server that the client processes in that round. We have
explored two implementation strategies for accounting for server messages when generating round
constraints:
• Eager: In this approach, eager round constraints are generated with the server-to-client messages
marked symbolic in the client software, just like user inputs. Each member ofG(i) is then built
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by conjoining an eager round constraint with one or more conjuncts of the form “svrmsg = m”,
where svrmsg is the symbolic variable for a server message in the client software, and m is
the concrete server message that this variable took on in round i. We refer to this approach as
“eager” since it enables precomputation of round constraints prior to verification but, in doing
so, also computes them for paths that may never be traversed in actual game play.
• Lazy: In this approach, lazy round constraints are generated from the client software after it
has been instantiated with the concrete server-to-client messages that the client processed
in that round; these round constraints for round i then constitute G(i) directly. Since the
server messages are themselves a function of game play, the lazy round constraints cannot be
precomputed (as opposed to eager round constraints) but rather must be computed as part
of verification. As such, the expense of symbolic execution is incurred during verification,
but only those paths consistent with server messages observed during game play need be
explored.
In either case, it is necessary that the server log the messages it sent and that the verifier know
which of these messages the client actually processed (versus, say, were lost). In our case study in
Section 3.3, we will discuss how we convey this information to the server, which it records for the
verifier.
As discussed above, the eager approach permits symbolic execution to be decoupled from
verification, in that eager round constraints can be computed in advance of game play and then
augmented with additional conjuncts that represent server messages processed by the client in
that round. As such, the generation of round constraints in the eager approach is a conceptually
direct application of a tool like klee (albeit one fraught with game-specific challenges, such as those
we discuss in Section 3.3.4). The lazy approach, however, tightly couples the generation of round
constraints and verification; below we briefly elaborate on its implementation.
To support the lazy approach, we extend klee by building a model of the network that permits
it access to the log of messages the client processed (from the server) in the current round i and any
message the client sent in that round. Below, we use the term active path to refer to an individual,
symbolically executing path through the client code. Each active path has its own index into the
message log, so that each can interact with the log independently.
26
To handle server-to-client messages from the log, we intercept the recv() system call and
instead call our own replacement function. This function first checks to see that the next message in
the network log is indeed a server-to-client message. If it is, we return the message and advance
this active path’s pointer in the log by one message. Otherwise, this active path has attempted
more network reads in round i than actually occurred in the network log prior to reaching the
breakpoint corresponding to a client-message send. In this case, we return zero bytes to the recv()
call, indicating that no message is available to be read. Upon an active path reaching the breakpoint
(which corresponds to a client send), if the next message in the log is a server-to-client message, then
this active path has attempted fewer network reads than the log indicates, and it is terminated as
invalid. Otherwise, the round constraint built so far is added to G(i), and the logged client message
is used to instantiate the new conjunct M in line 3 of Figure 3.2.
3.3 Case Study: XPilot
In our first case study, we apply our technique to XPilot, an open-source multiplayer game
written in about 150,000 lines of C code. XPilot uses a client-server architecture that has influenced
other popular open source games. For example, the authors of Freeciv used XPilot’s client-server
architecture as a basis for the networking in that game. XPilot was first released over 15 years ago,
but it continues to enjoy an active user base. In fact, in July 2009, 7b5 Labs released an XPilot client
for the Apple iPhone and Apple iPod Touch (see http://7b5labs.com/xpilotiphone), which is one
of several forks and ports of the XPilot code base over the years. We focus on one in particular called
XPilot NG (XPilot Next Generation).
3.3.1 The Game
The game’s style resembles that of Asteroids, in which the player controls an avatar in the form
of a spaceship, which she navigates through space, avoiding obstacles and battling other ships. But
XPilot adds many new dimensions to game play, including computer-controlled players, several
multiplayer modes (capture the flag, death match, racing, etc.), networking (needed for multiplayer),
better physics simulation (e.g., accounting for fuel weight in acceleration), and updated graphics.
In addition, XPilot is a highly configurable game, both at the client and the server. For example,
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clients can set key mappings, and servers can configure nearly every aspect of the game (e.g., ship
mass, initial player inventory, probability of each type of power-up appearing on the map, etc.).
As we have discussed, developers of today’s networked games design clients with little authori-
tative state in order to help address cheating. In keeping with that paradigm, XPilot was written
with very little such state in the client itself. Despite this provision, there are still ways a malicious
user can send invalid messages in an attempt to cheat. In XPilot, there are some sets of keys that the
client should never report pressing simultaneously. For example, a player cannot press the key to
fire (KEY FIRE SHOT) while at the same time pressing the key to activate his shield (KEY SHIELD). A
valid game client will filter out any attempts to do so, deactivating the shield whenever a player
is firing and bringing it back online afterward. However, an invalid game client might attempt to
gain an advantage by sending a keyboard update that includes both keys. As it happens, the server
does its own (manually configured) checking and so the cheat fails in this case, but the fact that
the client behavior is verifiably invalid remains. There are numerous examples of similar cheats
in online games that servers fail to catch, either because of programming errors or because those
particular misuses of the protocol were unforeseen by the game developers. In our evaluations, we
confirmed that our technique detects this attempt to cheat in XPilot, as expected. This detection
was a direct result of the logic inherent in the game client, in contrast to the manually programmed
rule in the XPilot server. While this example is illustrative, we emphasize that our goal is not to
identify new cheating vulnerabilities on the XPilot server, but rather to illustrate how a pre-existing
game client can be adapted for verification in our framework and how the verifier performs under
different configurations.
At the core of the architecture of the XPilot client is a main loop that reads input from the
user, sends messages to the server, and processes new messages from the server. In Section 3.3.3
and Section 3.3.4, we describe the verification of XPilot client behavior by generating lazy round
constraints and eager round constraints for this loop, respectively. However, we first describe
modifications we made to XPilot, in order to perform verification.
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3.3.2 Client Modifications
Message acknowledgments
Client-server communication in XPilot uses UDP traffic for its timeliness and decreased overhead
— the majority of in-game packets are relevant only within a short time after they are sent (e.g.,
information about the current game round). For any traffic that must be delivered reliably (e.g.,
chat messages between players), XPilot uses a custom layer built atop UDP. Due to XPilot’s use of
UDP and the fact that it can process arbitrary numbers of messages in a single client loop, we added
to XPilot an acknowledgement scheme to inform the server of which inbound messages the client
processed in each loop iteration and between sending its own messages to the server. The server
logs this information for use by the verifier. There are many possible efficient acknowledgement
schemes to convey this information; the one we describe in Section 3.7 assumes that out-of-order
arrival of server messages is rare.
These acknowledgments enable the server to record a log of relevant client events in the order
they happened (as reported by the client). For each client-to-server message that the server never
received, the verifier simply replaces the constraint M implied by the missing message (see line 3 of
Figure 3.2) with M = true.
Floating-point operations
XPilot, like most games of even moderate size, includes an abundance of floating-point variables
and math. However, it is not currently possible to generate constraints on floating-point numbers
with klee or to check them using stp. Therefore, we implement XPilot’s floating-point operations
using a simple fixed-point library of our own creation. As a result, symbolic execution on the
XPilot client produces constraints from this library for every mathematical operation in the client
code involving a symbolic floating-point number. These constraints, in turn, inflate the verification
speeds reported in Section 3.3.4, in particular.
Bounding loops
The number of round constraints can grow rapidly as new branch points are encountered during
path traversal. Loops in the code can be especially problematic; a loop with up to n iterations induces
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Ω(n2) round constraints. During symbolic execution of XPilot, most loops have a concrete number
of iterations, but there are some loops that iterate over a symbolic variable. If this symbolic variable
is unbounded, then the number of round constraints can become impractical to manage. While
some loops are not explicitly bounded in the code, they are implicitly bounded by the environment
during normal execution. For example, the user input loop in XPilot is a while loop that continues
until there are no longer any queued user input events to process. During normal execution, the
number of iterations of this loop is limited by how fast a player can press a key. As such, during
symbolic execution, we limited the input processing loop to a maximum of three iterations because
we observed that during gameplay, this queue never contained more than three events. The user
input loop and the packet processing loop in XPilot required this type of modification, but all other
loops were exhaustively searched.
Client trimming
The XPilot client, like presumably any game client, contains much code that is focused on
enhancing the user gaming experience but that has no effect on the messages that the client could
send to the server. To avoid analyzing this code, we trimmed much of it from the game client that
we subjected to analysis. Below we summarize the three classes of such code that we trimmed.
Aside from these three types of code, we also trimmed mouse input-handling code, since all game
activities can be performed equivalently using the keyboard.
First, several types of user inputs impact only the graphical display of the game but have no
effect on the game’s permissible behaviors as seen by the server. For example, one type of key press
adjusts the display of game-play statistics on the user’s console. As such, we excised these inputs
from the client software for the purposes of our analysis.
Second, there are certain “reliable” messages the server sends the client (using the custom
reliable-delivery protocol built over UDP). Reliable traffic is vital to the set-up and tear-down of
games and game connections, but once play has begun, reliable messages are irrelevant for game
play. Types of messages the server sends reliably are in-game chat messages (both among players
and from the server itself), information about new players that have joined, and score updates, all
of which are relatively infrequent and purely informational, in the sense that their delivery does not
alter the permissible client behaviors. As such, we ignored them for the purpose of our analysis.
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Third, klee is built upon llvm and requires the input executable to be compiled into the llvm
intermediate representation (IR). Like all software, XPilot does not execute in isolation and makes
use of external libraries; not all of these were compiled into llvm IR. Specifically, the graphics library
was not symbolically executed by klee, and instead any return values from graphics calls that XPilot
later needed were simply declared symbolic.
3.3.3 Verification with Lazy Round Constraints
In this section we measure the performance of verification using lazy round constraints. As
discussed in Section 3.2, lazy round constraints are generated once the client-to-server and server-
to-client messages are known. Thus, the only unknown inputs to the game client when generating
lazy round constraints are the user inputs and time readings (and random coin flips, but these do
not affect server-visible behavior in XPilot).
In generating lazy round constraints, we departed slightly from the description of our approach
in Section 3.2, in that we inserted multiple breakpoints in the client event loop, rather than only a
single breakpoint. Each breakpoint provides an opportunity to prune accumulated constraints and,
in particular, to delete multiple copies of the same accumulated constraint. This is accomplished
using a variant of the algorithm in Figure 3.2, using constraints derived from prefixes of the loop
leading to the breakpoint, in place of full round constraints. Some of these extra breakpoints
correspond to the (multiple) send locations in XPilot’s loop. Aside from this modification, we
implemented our approach as described in Section 3.2.
We ran our lazy client verifier on a 2,000-round XPilot game log (about a minute of game-play
time) on a single core of a 3GHz processor. Figure 3.3(a) describes the per-round validation cost
(in seconds) using a box-and-whiskers plot per 125 rounds: the box illustrates the 25th, 50th, and
75th percentiles; the whiskers cover points within 1.5 times the interquartile range; and circles
denote outliers. The per-round verification times averaged 8.6s with a standard deviation of 2.74s.
In these experiments, the verifier’s memory usage remained below 256MB. As an aside, in every
round, there was exactly one remaining satisfiable accumulated constraint, indicating that, without
client state, there is little ambiguity at the verifier about exactly what is happening inside the client
program, even from across the network.
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Figure 3.3. Verification cost per round while checking a 2,000-round XPilot game log
By employing an XPilot-specific optimization, we were able to significantly improve verification
performance. After the trimming described in Section 3.3.2, the user input paths that we included
within our symbolic execution of the client each caused another client-to-server message to be sent,
and so the number of such sends in a round indicates to the verifier an upper bound on the number
of user inputs in that round. As such, we could tune the verifier’s symbolic execution to explore
only paths through the client where the number of invocations of the input-handling function
equals the number of client messages for this round in the log. This optimization yields the graph
in Figure 3.3(b). Notice that there are three distinct bands in the graph, corresponding to how many
times the input-handling function within the game client was called. The first band contains rounds
which called the input handler zero times and represents the majority (90.1%) of the total rounds.
These rounds were the quickest to process, with a mean cost of 53.8ms and a standard deviation of
21.1ms. The next-largest band (5.1%) contains rounds which called the input handler only once.
These rounds took longer to process, with a mean of 3.26s and a standard deviation of 1.05s. The
final band represents rounds with more than one call to the input-handling function. This band
took the longest to process (12.9s, on average), but it was also the smallest, representing only 4.1%
of all rounds.
32
3.3.4 Verification with Eager Round Constraints
In this section we discuss verification of XPilot using eager constraint generation. Recall that
eager round constraints are precomputed from the sanctioned client software without knowledge
of the messages the client will process in any given loop iteration. However, we found this approach
to require moderate manual tuning to be practical, as we describe below.
Manual Tuning
A direct application of our method for generating eager round constraints for the XPilot client
loop would replace the user key press with symbolic input and any incoming server message with
a symbolic buffer and then use klee to symbolically execute the resulting client program. Such a
direct application, however, encountered several difficulties. In this section we describe the main
difficulties we encountered in this direct approach and the primary adaptations that we made in
order to apply it to the XPilot client. These adaptations highlight an important lesson: the eager
technique, while largely automatic, can require some manual tuning to be practical. Because our
technique is targeted toward game developers, we believe that allowing for such manual tuning is
appropriate.
Frame processing
In XPilot, messages from the server to the client describing the current game state are called
frames. Each frame is formed of a chain of game packets (not to be confused with network packets).
The first and last packets in a frame are always special start-of-frame and end-of-frame packets, called
PKT START and PKT END. Figure 3.4 shows an XPilot frame, containing a packet of type PKT FUEL
and potentially others (indicated by “. . .”). Packets are encoded as a single header byte followed
by a packet data section that can carry anything from a single byte to an arbitrary-length string,
depending on the packet type. Frames may contain multiple packet types and multiple instances of
the same packet type.
Consider the client’s frame-processing algorithm. Given a frame, it first reads the packet header
(i.e., the first byte), then calls the handler for that packet, which processes the packet and advances
the frame pointer so that the new “first byte” is the packet header of the next packet in the frame.
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PKT START header
PKT START data
...
PKT FUEL header
PKT FUEL data
...
. . .
PKT END header
PKT END data
...
Figure 3.4. XPilot frame layout
This continues until the packet handler for PKT END is called, the return of which signifies the
end of the frame handling. Therefore, given a completely symbolic buffer representing the frame,
our symbolic execution would need to walk the client code for each possible sequence of packets in
a frame, up to the maximum frame size. But XPilot has dozens of packet types, some of which
include a very small amount data. As evidence of the infeasibility of such an approach, consider
the following (very conservative) lower bound on the number of packet sequences: There are at
least 10 types of packets that we considered whose total size is at most 5 bytes. The maximum size
for a server-to-client frame in XPilot is 4,096 bytes, which means there is room for over 800 of these
packets. That gives at least 10800 possible packet sequences that symbolic execution would traverse
to generate constraints, which is obviously infeasible.
To make eager constraint generation feasible, then, we adapt our approach to generate round
constraints by starting and stopping symbolic execution at multiple points within the loop, as
opposed to just the beginning and end. In particular, we apply symbolic execution to the frame-
processing and user input-processing portions of the loop separately, to obtain user-input constraints
and frame-processing constraints, which in turn the verifier pieces together during verification to con-
struct the round constraints. Moreover, the verifier can construct the frame-processing constraints
on the basis of the particular frame the server sent to the client. It does so dynamically from
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packet-processing constraints that characterize how the client should process each packet in the
particular frame. For example, if the only packet types were PKT START, PKT FUEL, PKT TIME LEFT,
and PKT END, the packet-processing constraints representing the processing of a single packet would
be
(p = PKT START) ∧ (constraints for(PKT START))
(p = PKT FUEL) ∧ (constraints for(PKT FUEL))
(p = PKT TIME LEFT) ∧ (constraints for(PKT TIME LEFT))
(p = PKT END) ∧ (constraints for(PKT END))
where p is a variable for the packet type and constraints for(PKT START) represents the additional
constraints that would result from symbolic execution of the packet handler for PKT START. With this
new model of packet processing, the verifier can build a frame-processing constraint to represent
any given frame from the logs. In this way, when the verifier checks the behavior of a given client,
it does so armed with the frames the server sent to the client, the messages the server received from
the client, and the frame-processing constraints that characterize the client’s processing of each
frame, which the verifier constructs from the packet-processing constraints.
Packet processing
Certain individual packet types present their own tractability challenges as well. For example,
the payload for a certain packet begins with a 32-bit mask followed by one byte for each bit in the
mask that is equal to 1. The client then stores these remaining bytes in a 32-byte array at the offsets
determined by the mask (setting any bytes not included in the message to 0). In the packet handler,
the XPilot client code must sample the value of each bit in the mask in turn. Since the payload (and
thus the mask) is symbolic, each of these conditionals results in a fork of two separate paths (for the
two possible values of the bit in question). Our symbolic execution of this packet handler, then,
would produce over 4 billion round constraints, which is again infeasible. We could have changed
the XPilot protocol to avoid using the mask, sending 32 bytes each time, but doing so would increase
network bandwidth needlessly. Instead, we note that the result of this packet handler is that the
destination array is set according to the mask and the rules of the protocol. We thus added a simple
rule to the verifier that, when processing this type of packet, generates a constraint defining the
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value of the destination array directly, as the packet handler would have. Then, when symbolically
executing the packet handlers, we can simply skip this packet.
To avoid similar modifications to the extent possible, we pruned the packets the verifier considers
during verification to only those that are necessary. That is, there are several packet types that will
not alter the permissible behaviors of the client as could be witnessed by the server, and so we
ignored them when applying our technique. Most of these packet types represent purely graphical
information. For example, a packet of type PKT ITEM simply reports to the client that a game item
of a given type (e.g., a power-up or a new weapon) is floating nearby at the given coordinates. This
information allows the client to draw the item on the screen, but it does not affect the valid client
behaviors as observable by the verifier.1
User input
The first part of the client input loop checks for and handles input from the player. Gathering
user-input constraints is fairly straightforward, with the exception that XPilot allows players to do
an extensive amount of keyboard mapping, including configurations in which multiple keys are
bound to the same function, for example. We simplified the generation of constraints by focusing
on the user actions themselves rather than the physical key presses that caused them. That is, while
generating constraints within the user-input portion of XPilot, we begin symbolic execution after
the client code looks up the in-game action bound to the specific physical key pressed, but before
the client code processes that action. For example, if a user has bound the action KEY FIRE SHOT
to the key ‘a’, our analysis would focus on the effects of the action KEY FIRE SHOT, ignoring the
actual key to which it is bound. However, as with other client configuration options, the keyboard
mapping could easily be sent to the server as a requirement of joining the game, invoking a small,
one-time bandwidth cost that would allow the verifier to check the physical key configuration.
1In particular, whether the client processes this packet is irrelevant to determining whether the client can pick up the
game item described in the packet. Whether the client obtains the item is unilaterally determined by the server based on
it computing the client’s location using the low-level client events it receives — an example of how nearly all control is
stripped from clients in today’s games, owing to how they cannot be trusted.
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Eager Verification Performance
We ran our eager client verifier on the same 2,000-round XPilot game log and on the same com-
puter used in Section 3.3.3. Figure 3.3(c) describes the per-round validation cost (in seconds) using
a box-and-whiskers plot. As in Figure 3.3(b), we employed here an XPilot-specific optimization
by observing that the number of client messages in a round bounds the number of user inputs
in that round. As such, in piecing together round constraints, the verifier includes a number of
copies of user-input constraints (see Section 3.3.4) equal to the client sends in that round. Similar
to Figure 3.3(b), Figure 3.3(c) exhibits three bands (the third comprising a few large values), corre-
sponding to different numbers of copies. The large percentage of rounds contained no user inputs
and were the quickest to process, with a mean cost of 1.64s and a standard deviation of 0.232s. The
second band of rounds — those with a single user input — took longer to process, with a mean of
11.3s and a standard deviation of 1.68s. Remaining rounds contained multiple user inputs and took
the longest to process (34.2s, on average), but recall that they were by far the least frequent. The
verifier’s memory usage remained below 100MB throughout these verification runs.
Comparing Figures 3.3(b) and 3.3(c), the times for the eager approach are much slower than
those for the lazy approach, when applied to XPilot. This performance loss is due to the fact that
a large portion of the XPilot client code is dedicated to handling server messages. And while the
verifier in the eager case has preprocessed this portion of the code, the resulting round constraints
are much more complex than in the lazy approach, where the verifier knows the exact values of the
server messages when generating round constraints. This complexity results in constraint solving
in the eager case (line 7 of Figure 3.2) being more expensive.
It is also important to recall that lazy and eager are not interchangeable, at least in terms of
game developer effort. As discussed in Section 3.3.4, achieving feasible generation of eager round
constraints required substantial additional manual tuning, and consequently greater opportunity
for programmer error. As such, it appears that the eager approach is inferior to the lazy approach
for XPilot. Another comparison between the two approaches, with differing results, will be given in
Section 3.4.
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3.4 Case Study: Cap-Man
Our client verification technique challenges the current game-design philosophy by allowing
servers to relinquish authoritative state to clients while retaining the ability to validate client
behavior and thus detect cheating. As a way of demonstrating this notion, we have written a game
called Cap-Man that is based on the game Pac-Man. In some ways Cap-Man is easier to validate than
XPilot was — it represents a considerably smaller code base (roughly 1,000 lines of C code) and
state size.
That said, Cap-Man is interesting as a case study for three reasons. First, whereas XPilot was
written with virtually no authoritative client state, we will see that Cap-Man is intentionally rife with
it, providing a more interesting challenge for our technique because it is so much more vulnerable
to invalid messages. Second, the size of its code base allows us to conduct a more direct comparison
between lazy and eager verification. Third, Cap-Man differs from XPilot in that the set of possible
user inputs per round is substantially larger than the set of paths through the client’s event loop.
That is, in XPilot, there is nearly a one-to-one correspondence between user inputs and paths
through the client event loop, which dampens the improvement that our technique offers over, e.g.,
the verifier simply running the client on all possible inputs in each round. Cap-Man demonstrates
the scalability of our technique to many possible user inputs when this is not the case, thereby
separating our technique from other such possible approaches.
3.4.1 The Game
Cap-Man is a Pac-Man-like game in which a player controls an avatar that is allowed to move
through a discrete, two-dimensional map with the aim of consuming all remaining “food” items
before being caught by the various enemies (who are also navigating the map). Each map location is
either an impenetrable wall or an open space, and the open spaces can contain an avatar, an enemy,
pieces of food, a power-up, or nothing at all. When a player reaches a map location that contains
food or a power-up, he automatically consumes it. Upon consuming a power-up, the player enters a
temporary “power-up mode,” during which his pursuers reverse course — trying to escape rather
than pursue him — and he is able to consume (and temporarily displace) them if he can catch them.
In addition to these features (which were present in Pac-Man as well), we have added a new feature
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to Cap-Man to invite further abuse and create more uncertainty at the server: A player may set a
bomb (at his current location), which will then detonate a number rounds in the future selected
by the user from a predefined range (in our implementation, between 3 and 15 rounds).2 When it
detonates, it kills any enemies (or the player himself) within a certain radius on the map. Players
are not allowed to set a new bomb until their previous bomb has detonated.
Cap-Man uses a client-server architecture, which we designed specifically to go against current
game-development best practices: i.e., it is the server, not the client, which has a minimum of
authoritative state. The client tracks his own map position, power-up-mode time remaining, and
bomb-placement details. Specifically, at every round, the client sends a message to the server
indicating its current map position and remaining time in power-up mode. It also sends the position
of a bomb explosion, if there was one during that round. Note that the client never informs the
server when it decides to set a bomb. It merely announces when and where detonation has occurred.
The server, in contrast, sends the client the updated positions of his enemies — this being the only
game state for which the server has the authoritative copy.
The design of Cap-Man leaves it intentionally vulnerable to a host of invalid-message attacks.
For example, although valid game clients allow only contiguous paths through the map, a cheating
player can arbitrarily adjust his coordinates, ignoring the rules of the game — a cheat known in
game-security parlance as “telehacking.” He might also put himself into power-up mode at will,
without bothering to actually consume a power-up. Finally, there is no check at the server to see
whether or not a player is lying about a bomb placement by, for example, announcing an explosion
at coordinates that he had not actually occupied within the past 15 rounds. In fact, the Cap-Man
server contains no information about (or manual checks regarding) the internal logic of the game
client.
In order to detect cheating in Cap-Man, we apply our technique in both its lazy and eager varia-
tions. Due to Cap-Man’s smaller size and simpler code structure, we can generate round constraints
over an entire iteration of the main loop in each case, without the need to compartmentalize the
code and adopt significant trimming measures as we did for XPilot.
2In our preliminary work [8], a bomb detonated in a fixed number of rounds. We changed the game to accommodate a
user-selected number of rounds to bomb detonation in order to demonstrate the ability of our technique to scale to a
larger number of possible user inputs.
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Figure 3.5. Verifying a 2,000-round Cap-Man game log
3.4.2 Evaluation
Using our technique, we are able to detect invalid-command cheats of all the types listed above.
Below we present the results of client-validity checks on a game log consisting of 2,000 rounds
(about 6-7 minutes of game-play time), during which the player moved around the map randomly,
performing (legal) bomb placements at random intervals.
Figure 3.5 shows that the verification costs for Cap-Man were consistently small, with a mean
and standard deviation of 752ms and 645ms for verification via lazy round constraints (Figure 3.5(a))
and a mean and standard deviation of 310ms and 193ms for verification using eager round con-
straints (Figure 3.5(b)). The lazy method was (on average) roughly 2.5 times slower than the eager
method, owing to the overhead of symbolic execution to compute round constraints for each round
individually during verification. The verifier’s memory usage remained below 100MB throughout
verification of both types. While in the XPilot case study, eager verification required significantly
greater development effort (see Section 3.3.4), this additional effort was unnecessary with Cap-Man
due to its relative simplicity.
Figure 3.5(c) shows the number of satisfiable accumulated constraints during eager verification,
which did not trend upward during the run. In lazy verification, the number of satisfiable accu-
mulated constraints was virtually identical. (Variations in our pruning implementations caused
less than 1% of the rounds to differ, and then by at most 12 accumulated constraints.) In the case
of XPilot, the number of satisfiable accumulated constraints was always 1, but in Cap-Man there
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were often multiple accumulated constraints that remained satisfiable at any given round. This
increase resulted primarily from state the Cap-Man client maintains but does not immediately
report to the server (e.g., whether a bomb has been set, and with what detonation timer). The
relationship between this hidden state and the number of satisfiable accumulated constraints is an
important one. Consider the verification of a Cap-Man game that is currently in round i, with no
bomb placements in the last 15 rounds (unbeknownst to the verifier). The verifier must maintain
accumulated constraints that reflect possible bomb placements at each of rounds i− 14 through i.
Upon encountering msg i+1 with an announcement of a bomb explosion, the verifier can discard not
only all current accumulated constraints which do not include a bomb placement in any of rounds
i− 14 through i− 2, but also those accumulated constraints which do include bomb placements in
rounds i− 1 through i+ 1, because players can only have one pending bomb at a time. This rule
was not manually configured into the verifier; it was inferred automatically from the client code.
3.5 Case Study: TetriNET
As discussed earlier, our verification technique presents opportunities to reduce the bandwidth
consumed by an online game, since it allows the client’s management of state to be verified with
less-than-complete information. In our third case study, we used a pre-existing game called TetriNET
in order to explore simple bandwidth-savings measures and their impact on client verification
performance.
3.5.1 The Game
TetriNET is a multiplayer clone of the classic puzzle game Tetris. It was originally developed in
1997 but remains popular and has been reimplemented on many different platforms. In the game,
random tetrominoes, which are geometric shapes consisting of four connected blocks, automatically
advance down each player’s playing field, one at a time. As each does, the player can rotate it into
four possible orientations or slide it horizontally left or right. The objective of the game is to arrange
tetrominoes so that, as they land, they create gapless horizontal rows of blocks on the playing field.
When such a gapless row is created, it is cleared, each row of blocks above it falls down one row,
and — in the primary multiplayer departure from Tetris — a line with gaps is added to the bottom
41
of the other players’ fields. A player loses when there is no room for an additional tetromino to
enter her playing field. TetriNET is implemented in C and has a client-server architecture similar to
Cap-Man and XPilot. The server does virtually no checking on client messages and so is vulnerable
to cheats; e.g., a client could indicate it cleared a row that has gaps or placed a new tetromino in a
spot that the client should not have allowed it to reach.
Enabling the use of our verification tool with TetriNET required some consideration of how the
user input operates. A tetromino in play automatically moves down one row every 0.5 seconds, and
when the piece can move no further, the position is fixed and a new random piece starts falling from
the top of the game screen. The placement of the tetromino in a permanent resting point defines the
end of single round of gameplay, at which time the x and y coordinates and the rotation z are sent to
the server. Until the end of the round, though, the player can move the piece horizontally or rotate
it as many times as she wishes. So, even though there is a finite number of final fixed positions for a
game piece in a given round, there are theoretically an infinite number of possible inputs sequences
that could lead to each valid final position. To minimize the number of input sequences that must
be explored symbolically, we considered a restricted version of gameplay where the gameboard
must be empty above each tetrimino at the time of its placement, and so three rotations and six
horizontal moves sufficed to reach any such placement on the 12-column gameboard.
3.5.2 Evaluation
To demonstrate bandwidth reduction in TetriNET using our verification technique, we simply
reduced the information in the client-to-server messages. TetriNET was modified so that only every
k rounds was the complete tuple (x, y, z) sent to the server (an “unabridged message”). In other
rounds, the client sent a partial tuple, omitting x, y, or z or both y and z. Figure 3.6 shows the
tradeoff between the bandwidth reductions accomplished and the costs of verifying client behavior
using the lazy client verifier, where the bandwidth reductions were calculated assuming x, y and
z are sent in four, five, and two bits, respectively. (The actual TetriNET implementation is not
engineered for bandwidth reduction and so uses payload space more wastefully.) These graphs
each represent five random play sessions of 100 rounds each and the same five play sessions were
used for each of the four experiments. Note that k = 1 is equivalent to verification of an unmodified
game client. In the experiment where y is omitted, the verification cost does not increase because
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Figure 3.6. Verification of 100-round TetriNET logs under different configurations of client-to-server message
content.
there is no ambiguity as to y’s value when x and z are provided. During these verification runs, the
verifier’s memory usage remained below 512MB.
3.6 Verification with message loss
Games today must be built to tolerate a range of networking conditions, including occasional
message loss. While there are standard approaches to recovering lost messages, such as message
retransmission at the transport level (i.e., using TCP) or at the application level, retransmission is
avoided in some games for two reasons. First, the importance of some messages diminishes quickly,
and so by the time the message would be retransmitted, the utility of doing so is lost. Second,
retransmission can introduce overheads that high-performance games cannot tolerate.
Lost server-to-client messages pose little difficulty to our client verification technique; all the
verifier requires is to know what server-to-client messages the client processed and when, which can
be communicated from the client efficiently (e.g., see Section 3.7). Lost client-to-server messages pose
more difficulty, however. Intuitively, our technique can handle client message loss by instantiating
the constraint M for a missing round-i message msg i to simply M = “true” in Figure 3.2. However,
this has two negative consequences.
First, from the server’s (and verifier’s) perspective, it is impossible to distinguish a lost message
from one the client only pretended to send. This can be used by a cheating client to gain latitude in
terms of the behaviors that the verifier will consider legitimate. For example, whenever a power-up
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appears on the game map, an altered game client could collect it by reporting its player’s position at
the power-up’s location. So as to not be caught by the verifier, the client could alter its state to reflect
having sent messages that would have been induced by the player actually moving to that location,
even though these messages were never sent and so, from the server’s perspective, were lost. Because
it is possible for a valid client on a poor network connection to generate indistinguishable behavior,
this cheat is not in the class that our verifier detects. Nevertheless, as discussed in Chapter 2, our
techniques are compatible with existing methods that address this type of cheat.
Another consequence of message loss is that the performance of verification can be severely
impacted by it. The performance results in Section 3.3–3.4 did not reflect the loss of any client
messages; instead, the game logs that we validated included all messages that the client sent.
However, in practice message loss causes the accumulated constraints C i to grow dramatically,
since any path through the client that causes a message to be sent is deemed possible in round i. As
a result, in experimenting with message loss in XPilot, we found that in the face of lost messages,
the performance of our technique decays very substantially.
As such, we propose a lightweight scheme to enable our technique to retain its performance in
the face of (limited) message loss. Rather than retransmitting messages, our technique communicates
a small amount of additional information per client-to-server message to enable the verifier to prune
accumulated constraints effectively in the face of message loss. Intuitively, the client remembers
the path through its event loop that it traverses in round i and then conveys evidence of this to the
server over the next several messages. The server records this evidence for the verifier, which uses
it to prune round constraints considered for round i.
There are several ways to instantiate this intuition within our framework. Here we describe one
implementation that works well in XPilot. In this implementation, the “evidence” that the client
conveys to the server for the path it traversed in round i is a hash of the fields of the message it sent
in round i that are a function of (only) the path traversed. Rather than send the entire hash in a
subsequent message, however, the client “trickles” this hash value to the server, e.g., one bit per
message, so that subsequent message losses still enable the server to collect a number of hash bits
for each round. After the client’s messages are recorded at the server, the verifier collects these bits
and uses them to prune the round constraints considered at each step of verification where it is
missing a message.
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Figure 3.7. Verification (lazy) of 2000-round XPilot log with loss of client-to-server messages at the rate
indicated on horizontal axis.
We have prototyped this approach in the context of lazy verification, in order to validate the
ability of the XPilot verifier to retain its performance in the face of message losses. (Cap-Man and
TetriNET use TCP and so do not face message-loss issues.) The hash we use is a 16-bit BSD sum,
and the k-th bit of the round-i message hash is carried on the round i+ k message (1 ≤ k ≤ 16). As
such, each message carries an extra 16 bits composed of bits from the previous 16 client-to-server
messages.
To show the effectiveness of this approach, we repeated the lazy verification of 2000-round
XPilot game logs using XPilot-specific optimizations (c.f., Figure 3.3(b)) but introduced client-to-
server message losses to show that our approach tolerates them seamlessly. We experimented with
two types of message loss. In the first, each client-to-server message is lost with a fixed probability.
Figure 3.7 shows box-and-whiskers plots that illustrate the per-round verification costs that resulted,
as a function of this loss rate. Note that a message loss rate of 4% earns a “critical” designation
at a real-time monitoring site like www.internetpulse.net. As Figure 3.7 shows our technique can
easily handle such a high loss rate.
A second type of loss with which we experimented is a burst loss, i.e., the loss of a contiguous
sequence of client-to-server messages. Figure 3.8 shows the verification costs per round in five
different message logs in which a burst loss of length 6, 10, or 14 client-to-server messages is
introduced at a random point between the 100th and 150th round. As these graphs show, the
verification costs do tend to spike in the region where the burst loss occurs, but the verification
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costs remain feasible and recover after the burst to their original durations. Only when the burst
length exceeds 16 (not shown) do the verification costs become and remain too large to be practical.
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Figure 3.8. Verification (lazy) of XPilot logs with randomly induced bursts of client-to-server message losses.
Shaded areas designate rounds in which losses occurred.
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3.7 Acknowledgement Scheme for XPilot
As discussed in Section 3.3.2, an efficient acknowledgement scheme allows the server (and
hence verifier) knowledge of the order (and loop iterations) in which the client processed server
messages and sent its own messages. Below we describe one such scheme that is optimized for
messages that arrive at the client mostly in order.
In this scheme, the XPilot client includes a sequence number c2sNbr on each message it sends to
the server, and similarly the server includes a sequence number s2cNbr on each message it sends to
the client. Each message from the server to a client also includes the largest value of c2sNbr received
from that client. In each client message, the client includes c2sAckd , the largest value of c2sNbr
received in a server message so far; a sequence lateMsgs[] of server message sequence numbers; and
a sequence eventSeq [] of symbols that encode events in the order they happened at the client. The
symbols in eventSeq [] can be any of the following. Below, s2cAckd is the largest sequence number
s2cNbr received by the client before sending message c2sAckd , and similarly loopAckd is the largest
client loop iteration completed at the client prior to it sending c2sAckd .
• Loop denotes a completed loop iteration. The j-th occurrence of Loop in eventSeq [] denotes
the completion of loop iteration loopAckd + j.
• Send denotes the sending of a message to the server. The j-th occurrence of Send in eventSeq []
denotes the sending of client message c2sAckd + j.
• Recv and Skip denote receiving or skipping the next server message in sequence. The j-th
occurrence of Recv or Skip in eventSeq [] denotes receiving or skipping, respectively, server
message s2cAckd + j. Here, a message a skipped if it has not arrived by the time a server
message with a larger sequence number arrives, and so a series of one or more Skip symbols
is followed only by Recv in eventSeq [].
• Late denotes the late arrival of a message, i.e., the arrival of a message that was previously
skipped. The j-th occurrence of Late in eventSeq [] denotes the arrival of server message
lateMsgs[j].
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As such, lateMsgs[] contains a sequence number for each server message that arrives after
another with a larger sequence number, and so lateMsgs[] should be small. eventSeq [] may contain
more elements, but the symbols can be encoded efficiently, e.g., using Huffman coding [47], and in
at most three bits per symbol in the worst case. Note that the server can determine s2cAckd and
loopAckd based on the previous messages received from the client.
3.8 Summary
In this chapter, we described an approach to validate the server-visible behavior of remote
clients. Our approach validates that client behavior is a subset of the behaviors that would be
witnessed from the sanctioned client software, in light of the previous behaviors of the client and
the messages sent to that client. Our technique exploits a common structure in clients, namely a
loop that accepts server and user inputs, manages client state, and updates the server with necessary
information. Our technique applies symbolic execution to this loop to produce constraints that
describe its effects. The server operator can then automatically check the consistency of client
updates with these constraints oﬄine. We explored both lazy and eager approaches to constraint
generation and investigated the programmer effort each entails, as well as their performance.
We demonstrated our technique in the context of online games with three case studies. In the
first, we applied our validation approach to XPilot, an existing open-source game. We detailed the
ways we adapted our technique, in both the lazy and eager variants, to allow for efficient constraint
generation and server-side checking. While this effort demonstrated applying our approach to a
real game, it was less satisfying as a test for our technique, in that XPilot was developed in the mold
of modern games — with virtually no authoritative state at the client. We thus also applied our
technique to a simple game of our own design that illustrated the strengths of our technique more
clearly. We then showed simple ways to leverage our technique to reduce bandwidth consumption
in a game called TetriNET, and returned to XPilot to demonstrate a strategy for dealing with message
loss.
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CHAPTER 4: GUIDED CLIENT VERIFICATION
In this chapter we develop a client-checking algorithm that retains precision while permitting
better tradeoffs between bandwidth costs and computational expense in the common case of a
legitimate client. Our algorithm builds from the approach of Chapter 3 but makes use of a training
phase to guide a search for a path through the client program that could have produced a message
observed at the server. One configuration of our algorithm incurs no additional bandwidth costs, like
the approach in Chapter 3, but completes verification much more efficiently in the common case of a
legitimate client. Another configuration of our algorithm consumes minimal additional bandwidth
— in our tests, at most two bytes per client-to-server message — and completes verification even
faster in the common case of a legitimate client. Moreover, we reiterate that our algorithm is precise
in the sense of having no false negatives and no false positives. That is, any sequence of client
messages that our technique declares legitimate actually is, in the sense that there exist inputs that
would have driven the sanctioned client software to send that sequence of messages,1 and any
sequence of client messages that our technique declares impossible is actually inconsistent with the
client software.
To definitively conclude that a sequence of client messages is impossible (the uncommon case),
our algorithm incurs a cost similar to the technique in Chapter 3. As such, we expect our algorithm
to be useful primarily as an data reduction technique that prunes the client messages that must be
logged for oﬄine analysis by that (or another) technique. In addition, clients whose messages are
not verified quickly by our technique can be serviced only provisionally (e.g., with fewer privileges
and/or logging to enable undoing their effects) while their verification is completed oﬄine.
We evaluate our algorithm in the context of online games. Online games provide a useful
proving ground for our techniques due to the frequent manipulation of game clients for the purposes
of cheating [93, 61, 90] and due to the pressure that game developers face to minimize the bandwidth
1More precisely, the only source of false negatives is the fidelity of modeling values returned by components with which
the client software interacts (e.g., the client OS). This will be discussed further in Section 4.7.
consumed by their games [67]. Our evaluations show, for example, that verifying the behavior of
a valid client in the TetriNET game can often keep up with the pace of gameplay. Moreover, our
algorithm succeeds in verifying legitimate messages traces of the highly interactive XPilot game
without game restrictions required in Chapter 3.
The technique that we develop here is an extension of the technique presented in Chapter 3 and
as such, is also an application of symbolic execution [12]. Dynamic analysis techniques like symbolic
execution typically face scaling challenges as code complexity and execution length grow, and our
case is no exception. We believe that the technique we develop here to prioritize path analysis on
the basis of historical usage may be more broadly useful, i.e., outside of behavior verification in
distributed systems, to contain the expense of dynamic analysis.
The rest of this chapter is structured as follows. We discuss necessary background in Section 4.1,
and present our algorithm in Section 4.2 and Section 4.3. Evaluation results for this algorithm are
presented in Section 4.7, and we conclude in Section 4.8.
4.1 Goals, Assumptions and Limitations
The optimistic verification technique [26] is optimized for the common case of verifying a
message trace from a legitimate client. The method is designed to retain precision while permitting
better a tradeoff between bandwidth costs and computational expense. We make use of a training
stage to inform the verifier of past execution paths and an optional instrumented version of the
client client software that can convey ”hints” while running that can aid verification.
As in Chapter 3, the goal that motivates this chapter is the construction of a verifier to detect a
client in that exhibits behavior, as seen by the server, that is inconsistent with the sanctioned client
software and the application state known at the server. That is, the verifier discerns whether there
was any possible sequence of inputs to the sanctioned client software that could have given rise to
each message received at the server, given what the server knew about the client based on previous
messages from the client and the messages the server sent to the client. In doing so, our approach
should enable an automated, server-side validation procedure for client messages.
More specifically, consider a sequence of messages msg0,msg1, . . . that were sent or received by
the client, listed in the order in which the client sent or received them; we call such a sequence a
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message trace. Because the server received or sent, respectively, each of these messages, the server
knows their contents. In Chapter 3 we described an efficient method for the client to inform the
server of the order in which the client processed these messages. As such, the message trace
msg0,msg1, . . . is known to the server and, so, the verifier. We do not consider the loss of client-to-
server messages here in this chapter, though we could employ equally well the method to recover
from such losses that we can from Chapter 3.
The verifier’s goal is to find a sequence of client instructions, called an execution prefix and de-
noted Π, that begins at the client entry point and is consistent with the message trace msg0,msg1, . . ..
In this thesis we consider only single-threaded clients, and so Π must represent single-threaded
execution. More specifically, Πn is consistent with msg0,msg1, . . . ,msgn if the network I/O instruc-
tions (send and recv) in Πn number n+ 1 and match msg0,msg1, . . . ,msgn by type — i.e., if msg i
is a client-to-server message (respectively, server-to-client message), then the i-th network I/O
instruction is a send (respectively, recv) — and if the branches taken in Πn were possible given the
contents of msg0,msg1, . . . ,msgn. There may be many prefixes Π consistent with msg0,msg1, . . .
(e.g., depending on inputs to the client, such as user inputs or system-call return values), but if
there are none, then the trace msg0,msg1, . . . is impossible given the sanctioned client software.
The goal of the verifier is simply to determine if there exists an execution prefix that is consistent
with msg0,msg1, . . .; if not, then the verifier detects the client as compromised. Assuming that
client compromise is rare, our goal is to optimize locating such a prefix so that legitimate clients
(the common case) can be verified as quickly as possible. While ideally both validation of legitimate
clients and detection of compromised clients would be achieved online (i.e., at the pace of message
receipt), the number of execution prefixes to explore through the client will generally make it
infeasible to definitively detect a compromised client, since doing so requires checking that there is
no prefix Π that is consistent with the message trace msg0,msg1, . . .. However, we seek to show that
through judicious design of the verifier, it can validate most legitimate clients quickly. Requests from
clients that the server cannot validate quickly can then be subjected to stricter (though presumably
more expensive) sandboxing and/or logging for further analysis oﬄine.
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4.2 Training
The algorithm we present in this chapter to meet the goals described in Section 4.1 incorporates
a training phase that is used to configure the verifier.
4.2.1 Requirements
The training phase uses message traces of client behavior that should reflect to the greatest
degree possible the actual client behavior that will be subjected to verification. For example, in
the case of a client-server game, the training phase should make use of message traces of valid
gameplay. We stress that the training phase requires only valid message traces (i.e., for which there
exists an execution prefix consistent with each), and any invalid message traces will be detected as
such during the training process (albeit at substantial computational expense). As such, there is no
risk of “poisoning” the training process with invalid message traces, and gathering valid message
traces for training purposes can be done by executing the sanctioned client software artificially or
by recording message traces from actual client-server sessions.
4.2.2 Algorithm
As we will discuss in Section 4.3, during verification the verifier will attempt to find an execution
prefix Πn that is consistent with the message trace msg0, . . . ,msgn incrementally, i.e., by appending
to an execution prefix Πn−1 that is consistent with msg0, . . . ,msgn−1. To do so, it searches through
execution fragments in an effort to find one that it can append to create Πn. The goal of the training
phase, then, is to determine the order in which to search possible execution fragments.
More specifically, let an execution fragment be any nonempty path (i) beginning at the client
entry point, a select, or a send in the client software, (ii) ending at a send or recv, and (iii) having
no intervening send or recv instructions. Training produces a set Φ of execution fragments. As
we will discuss in Section 4.3, the verifier will examine execution fragments in an order guided
by Φ to extend an execution prefix Πn−1 to reach an execution prefix Πn that is consistent with a
message trace msg0, . . . ,msgn. Ideally, Φ would include the execution fragments that are commonly
exercised during execution or reasonable approximations thereof.
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The algorithm for constructing Φ starts from at least one message trace msg0,msg1, . . . and
execution prefix Π that is consistent with it. We do not necessarily require that Π is the actual
execution prefix that was executed to produce the trace, though if that execution prefix could
be recorded for the purposes of training, then it will certainly suffice. Alternatively, Π could be
produced from the trace (in an oﬄine fashion) using techniques from Chapter 3.
Given the execution prefix Π, the algorithm symbolically executes the sanctioned client software
on the path Π, maintaining the resulting symbolic state throughout this execution. This symbolic
state consists of memory regions populated by symbolic values with constraints. The constraints on
symbolic values are those implied by execution of the path Π; e.g., every branch condition involving
a symbolic value will generally add another constraint on that value, perhaps in relation to other
symbolic values. A memory region is concrete if it is constrained to be a single value.
From this symbolic execution, the training algorithm generates a “postcondition” for each
distinct execution fragment contained in Π. Specifically, after each execution of a fragment in Π, the
constraints on the symbolic state form a “postcondition term” for that fragment. The disjunction of
all postcondition terms collected after execution of the same fragment then forms the postcondition
for that fragment. Moreover, since the same fragment may appear in other execution prefixes Πˆ, the
postcondition terms from all such executions can contribute to the postcondition of the fragment.
We use this postcondition to then determine the messages in each trace with which the fragment
is consistent, where “consistent” has a meaning analogous to, but somewhat more generous than,
that for execution prefixes with respect to message traces. Specifically, an execution fragment is
consistent with a message msg if the fragment ends at an appropriate network I/O instruction —
send if msg is a client-to-server message, recv otherwise — and in the case of a send, if the fragment
postcondition does not contradict the possibility that msg was sent in that send or, in other words,
if the postcondition and the asserted message contents do not imply false.
Once the set of execution fragments consistent with each message is found, the next step of the
algorithm divisively clusters the execution fragments. The fragments are first clustered by the type
of their last instructions (send or recv) and then by their starting instructions; i.e., at the second
level, all fragments in the same cluster start at the same instruction and end at the same type of
network I/O instruction. Finally, each of these level-two clusters is clustered so that fragments
that are only small deviations from each other (in terms of the instructions executed) are in the
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same cluster. Specifically, each level-two cluster is clustered by (Levenshtein) edit distance using
k-medoid clustering to a fixed number of clusters k (or fewer if there are fewer than k fragments
in a level-two cluster). Once the execution fragments are clustered by edit distance, the medoid
of each cluster is added to Φ. In addition, all training messages consistent with any fragment are
retained as indicators for the fragment’s cluster (and the cluster’s medoid).
4.3 Verification
In this section, we discuss how the verifier, for the next message msgn in a message trace,
utilizes the clustering described in Section 4.2 to guide its search for an execution fragment of the
client to “explain” the client’s progress through it sending or receiving msgn. More specifically,
the verifier does so by finding an execution fragment to append to an execution prefix Πn−1 that
is consistent with msg0, . . . ,msgn−1, in order to produce an execution prefix Πn that is consistent
with msg0, . . . ,msgn.
Before describing the verifier algorithm, there are two important caveats to note. First, even
if there is an execution fragment that, appended to Πn−1, yields a Πn that is consistent with
msg0, . . . ,msgn, it may be that this fragment is not contained in Φ. Recall that Φ is only a partial list
of all execution fragments; it includes only the medoid fragments after clustering the execution
fragments from training. As such, it will not suffice for us to limit our attention only to the execution
fragments in Φ, and indeed a central innovation in our work is how we use Φ to guide the search for
execution fragments without being limited to it.
Second, even if the client is behaving legitimately, there may be no execution fragment that can
be appended to Πn−1 to produce an execution prefix Πn that is consistent with msg0, . . . ,msgn. In
this case, Πn−1 could not have been the path executed by the client through msg0, . . . ,msgn−1. So,
the verifier will need to backtrack to search for another Πˆn−1 that is consistent withmsg0, . . . ,msgn−1,
which the verifier will then try to extend to find a Πn consistent with msg0, . . . ,msgn. Of course,
backtracking can re-enter previous message verifications, as well, and in the limit, can devolve into
an exhaustive search for a path from the client entry point that is consistent with msg0, . . . ,msgn.
If and only if this exhaustive search concludes with no consistent path, the client is detected as
behaving inconsistently with the sanctioned client software and this exhaustive search will generally
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be costly. However, for the applications we consider in Section 4.7, legitimate clients rarely require
backtracking. Combined with optimizations to backtracking that we describe in Section 4.5, our
algorithm is a step toward making it possible to quickly verify legitimate clients for such applications
and triage those it cannot for further checking later (and sandboxing in the interim).
4.3.1 Guided Verification Algorithm
The verification algorithm takes as input an execution prefix Πn−1 consistent with msg0, . . .,
msgn−1 and that ends with the send or recv at which msgn−1 was sent or received. The verifier can
symbolically execute the sanctioned client software on the path Πn−1, using the concrete messages
msg0, . . ., msgn−1 as those sent or received at the corresponding network I/O instructions in Πn−1,
to yield the symbolic state σn−1 of the client.
Preprocessing for a server-to-client message
If msgn−1 is a server-to-client message, then presumably msgn−1 most directly influenced client
execution immediately after it was received. So, our algorithm to produce a Πn consistent with
msg0, . . . ,msgn first performs a preprocessing step by symbolically executing σn−1 forward using the
server-to-client messagemsgn−1 as the message received in its last instruction (which is a recv). σn−1
is a symbolic state and so may branch on symbolic variables as it is executed forward (even though
msgn−1 is concrete); preprocessing explores paths in increasing order of the number of symbolic
variables they include so far. This search continues until a path encounters an instruction that
suggests that the processing of msgn−1 by the client is complete — specifically, upon encountering
a select or a send. The path starting from σn−1 until this instruction are used to extend Πn−1 (and
σn−1) to produce Π+n−1 (and σ
+
n−1).
If msgn−1 is a client-to-server message, then no such preprocessing step is necessary. In this
case, let Π+n−1 and σ
+
n−1 be Πn−1 and σn−1, respectively.
Overview of basic verification algorithm
The core of the verification algorithm starts from the symbolic state σ+n−1 and uses a subset
Φn ⊆ Φ to guide a search for an execution fragment that can be appended to Π+n−1 to yield Πn that
is consistent with msg0, . . . ,msgn. Intuitively, Φn includes the execution fragments from Φ that
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are deemed likely to be similar to the fragment executed by the client leading up to it sending or
receiving msgn. We defer discussing the selection of Φn to Section 4.6; here we simply stipulate that
each fragment in Φn begins at the instruction pointed to by the program counter of σ+n−1 and ends
at a send or recv if msgn is a client-to-server message or a server-to-client message, respectively. We
stress that despite these constraints, appending a φ ∈ Φn to Π+n−1 will not necessarily yield a Πn
consistent with msg0, . . . ,msgn.
Our verification algorithm executes roughly as follows. The algorithm builds a strictly binary
tree of paths, each starting from the next instruction to be executed in σ+n−1. (Here, by “strictly”
we mean that every non-leaf node has exactly two children, not one.) The root of the tree is the
empty path, and the two children of a node in the tree extend the path represented by that node
through the next symbolic branch (i.e., branch instruction involving a symbolic variable). One
child represents that branch evaluating to false, and the other represents that branch evaluating to
true. The algorithm succeeds in finding a fragment with which to extend Π+n−1 to yield Πn if, upon
extending a path, it encounters a network I/O instruction that can “explain” msgn, i.e., that yields a
state with constraints that do not contradict msgn being the network I/O instruction’s message.
Perhaps the central idea in our algorithm, though, is the manner in which it selects the next
node of the tree to extend. For this purpose it uses the training fragments Φn. There are any number
of approaches, but the one we evaluate here selects the path to extend to be the one that minimizes
the edit distance to some prefix of a fragment in Φn (and that has not already been extended or
found to be inconsistent). This strategy naturally leads to first examining the fragments in Φn, then
other fragments that are small modifications to those in Φn, and finally other fragments that are
further from the fragments in Φn. This algorithm will be detailed more specifically below.
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Algorithm Client Verification
100: procedure verify(σ+n−1, msgn, Φn)
101: nd← makeNode() . Initialize root node
102: nd.path← 〈〉
103: nd.state← σ+n−1
104: Live← {nd}
105: while |Live| > 0 do
106: nd← arg min
nd′∈Live
min
φ∈Φn
min
φ′vφ
editDist(nd′.path, φ′) . Select node
107: Live← Live \ {nd}
108: pi ← nd.path
109: σ ← nd.state
110: while σ.next 6= ⊥ and isNetInstr(σ.next) = false and isSymbolicBranch(σ.next) = false
do
111: pi ← pi ‖ 〈σ.next〉
112: σ ← execStep(σ)
113: if isNetInstr(σ.next) = true then
114: if ((σ.constraints ∧ σ.next.msg = msgn) 6⇒ false) then
115: return pi ‖ 〈σ.next〉 . Success!
116: else if isSymbolicBranch(σ.next) = true then
117: nd.child0 ← makeNode()
118: nd.child0.path← pi ‖ 〈σ.next〉
119: nd.child0.state← [ execStep(σ) | σ.next.cond 7→ false ]
120: if nd.child0.state.constraints 6⇒ false then
121: Live← Live ∪ {nd.child0}
122: nd.child1 ← makeNode()
123: nd.child1.path← pi ‖ 〈σ.next〉
124: nd.child1.state← [ execStep(σ) | σ.next.cond 7→ true ]
125: if nd.child1.state.constraints 6⇒ false then
126: Live← Live ∪ {nd.child1}
127: return ⊥ . Failure
Figure 4.1. Basic verification algorithm, described in Section 4.3.1
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Details of basic verification algorithm
The algorithm for verifying a client-to-server message is summarized more specifically in
Figure 4.1. This algorithm, denoted verify, takes as input the symbolic state σ+n−1 resulting from
execution of Πn−1 from the client entry point on message trace msg0, . . . ,msgn−1 and then the
preprocessing step described above if msgn−1 is a server-to-client message; the next message msgn;
and the execution fragments Φn described above (and detailed in Section 4.6). Its output is either
an execution fragment that can be appended to Π+n−1 to make Πn that is consistent with msg0, . . .,
msgn, or undefined (⊥). The latter case indicates failure and, more specifically, that there is no
execution prefix that can extend Π+n−1 to make Πn that is consistent with msg0, . . ., msgn−1. This
will induce the backtracking described above to search for another Πˆn−1 that is consistent with
msg0, . . ., msgn−1, which the verifier will then try to extend to find a Πn consistent with msg0, . . .,
msgn.
The aforementioned binary tree is assembled as a collection of nodes created in lines 101, 117,
and 122 in Figure 4.1. Each node has fields path, state, and children child0 and child1. The root
node nd is initialized with nd.path = 〈〉 and nd.state = σ+n−1 (103). Initially only the root is created
(101–103) and added to a set Live (104), which includes the nodes that are candidates for extending.
The algorithm executes awhile loop (105–126) while Live includes nodes (105) and the algorithm has
not already returned (115). If the while loop exits because Live becomes empty, then the algorithm
has failed to find a suitable execution fragment and ⊥ is returned (127).
This while loop begins by selecting a node nd from Live that minimizes the edit distance to
some prefix of a fragment in Φn; see line 106, where φ′ v φ denotes that φ′ is a prefix of φ. The
selected node is then removed from Live (107) since any node will be extended only once. The
state σ of this node (109) is then executed forward one step at a time (σ ← execStep(σ), line 112)
and the execution path recorded (pi ← pi ‖ 〈σ.next〉, where ‖ denotes concatenation) until this
stepwise execution encounters the client exit (σ.next = ⊥, line 110), a network I/O instruction
(isNetInstr(σ.next) = true), or a symbolic branch (isSymbolicBranch(σ.next) = true). In the first case
(σ.next = ⊥), execution of the main while loop (105) continues to the next iteration. In the second
case (isNetInstr(σ.next) = true) and if the constraints σ.constraints accumulated so far with the
symbolic state σ do not contradict the possibility that the network I/O message σ.next.msg in the
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next instruction σ.next is msgn (i.e., (σ.constraints ∧ σ.next.msg = msgn) 6⇒ false, line 113), then the
algorithm returns successfully since pi ‖ 〈σ.next〉 is an execution fragment that meets the verifier’s
goals (115).
Finally, in the third case (isSymbolicBranch(σ.next) = true), the algorithm explores the two
possible ways of extending pi, namely by executing σ.next conditioned on the branch condition
evaluating to false (denoted [ execStep(σ) | σ.next.cond 7→ false ] in line 119) and conditioned on
the branch condition evaluating to true (124). In each case, the constraints of the resulting state are
checked for consistency (120, 125) and the consistent states are added to Live (121, 126).
4.4 Edit-distance calculations
As discussed previously, one insight employed in our verify algorithm is to explore paths
close to the training fragments Φn first, in terms of edit distance (line 106). Edit distance between
strings s1 and s2 can be computed by textbook dynamic programming in time O(|s1| · |s2|) and
space O(min(|s1|, |s2|)) where |s1| denotes the character length of s1 and similarly for s2. While
reasonably efficient, this cost can become significant for large s1 or s2.
For this reason, our implementation optimizes the edit distance computations. To do so, we
leverage an algorithm due to Ukkonen [80] that tests whether editDist(s1, s2) ≤ t and, if so, computes
editDist(s1, s2) in timeO(t·min(|s1|, |s2|)) and spaceO(min(t, |s1|, |s2|)) for a parameter t. By starting
with a small value for t, we can quickly find nodes nd′ ∈ Live such that for some φ ∈ Φn and φ′ v φ,
editDist(nd′.path, φ′) ≤ t. Only after such nodes are exhausted, do we then increase t and re-evaluate
the nodes still in Live. By proceeding in this fashion, verify incurs cost per edit-distance calculation
of O(t ·min(|s1|, |s2|)) for the distance threshold t when the algorithm returns, versus O(|s1| · |s2|).
Second, when calculating editDist(nd′.path, φ), it is possible to reuse intermediate results from
a previous calculation of editDist(nd′.path, φ′) in proportion to the length of the longest common
prefix of φ and φ′. (Since Φn contains only fragments beginning with the instruction to which the
program counter points in σn−1, their common prefix is guaranteed to be of positive length.) To take
maximum advantage of this opportunity to reuse previous calculations, we organize the elements
of Φn in a prefix tree (trie), in which each internal node stores the intermediate results that can be
reused when calculating editDist(nd′.path, φ) for the execution fragments Φn that share the prefix
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represented by the interior node. In a similar way, the calculation of editDist(nd′.path, φ) can reuse
intermediate results from the editDist(nd.path, φ) calculation, where nd′.path extends nd.path. In
this way, the vast majority of edit distance calculations are built by reusing intermediate results
from others.
Third, though the verification algorithm as presented in Figure 4.1 assembles each path pi
instruction-by-instruction (lines 110–112), the paths nd′.path and fragments Φn are not represented
as strings of instructions for the purposes of the edit distance calculation in line 106. If they were,
it would not be atypical for these strings to be of lengths in the tens of thousands for some of
the applications we consider in Section 4.7, yielding expensive edit-distance calculations. Instead,
nd′.path and Φn are represented as strings of basic block identifiers for the purposes of computing
their edit distance. In our evaluation, this representation resulted in strings that were roughly an
order of magnitude shorter than if they had been represented as strings of instructions.
4.4.1 Judicious use of edit distance
Despite the optimizations just described, calculating edit distances incurs a degree of overhead.
As such, we have found that for highly interactive applications, it is important to employ edit
distance only when Φn is likely to provide a useful guide in finding a pi with which to extend Πn−1
to obtain Πn.
For the applications with which we have experimented, the primary case where using edit
distance is counterproductive is when minφ∈Φn minφ′vφ editDist(nd′.path, φ′) is large for every nd′ ∈
Live. Because nodes are explored in increasing order of their edit distances from their nearest
prefixes of training fragments, this condition is an indication that the training fragments Φn are not
a good predictor of what happened in the client application leading up to the send or receipt of
msgn. This condition implies that verify now has little useful information to guide its search and so
no search strategy is likely to be a clear winner, and thus in this case we abandon the use of edit
distance to avoid calculating it. That is, we amend verify so that when
min
nd′∈Live
min
φ∈Φn
min
φ′vφ
editDist(nd′.path, φ′) > dmax
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for a fixed parameter dmax (dmax = 64 in our experiments in Section 4.7), verify transitions to selecting
nodes nd′ ∈ Live in increasing order of the number of symbolic variables introduced on nd′.path.
The rationale for this choice is that it tends to prioritize those states that reflect fewer user inputs
and is very inexpensive to track.
4.4.2 Selecting nd
In each iteration of the main while loop 105–126 of verify, the next node nd to extend is selected
as that in Live with a minimum “weight,” where its weight is defined by its edit distance to a prefix
of an element of Φn. Since the only operations on Live are inserting new nodes into it (lines 121, 126)
and extracting a node of minimum weight (line 106), Live is represented as a binary min-heap. This
enables both an insertion of a new element and the removal of its min-weight element to complete
in O(log |Live|) time where |Live| denotes the number of elements it contains when the operation
is performed. This (only) logarithmic cost is critical since Live can grow to be quite large; e.g., in
our tests described in Section 4.7, it was not uncommon for Live to grow to tens of thousands of
elements.
4.4.3 Memory management
The verification algorithm, upon traversing a symbolic branch, creates new symbolic states to
represent the two possible outcomes of the branch (lines 119 and 124). Each state representation
includes the program counter, stack and address space contents. While klee [17] (on which we
build) provides copy-on-write semantics for the address-space component, it does not provide for
garbage collection of allocated memory or a method to compactly represent these states in memory.
To manage the considerable growth in memory usage during a long running verification task, we
utilize a caching system that selectively frees in-memory representations of a state if necessary.
If at a later time a freed state representation is needed (due to backtracking, for example), our
system reconstructs the state from a previously checkpointed state. This method adds to the overall
verification time but reduces the extent to which memory is a limiting factor.
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4.5 Backtracking and Equivalent State Detection
As discussed at the start of Section 4.3, if verify(σ+n−1,msgn, Φn) returns⊥ (line 127), then it is not
possible that the client legitimately executed Π+n−1, producing state σ
+
n−1, and then sent/received
msgn. If msgn−1 is a client-to-server message (and so Π+n−1 = Πn−1), verification must then backtrack
into the computation verify(σ+n−2, msgn−1, Φn−1) to find a different fragment to append to Π
+
n−2 to
yield a new execution prefix Πˆn−1 consistent with msg0, . . ., msgn−1 and resulting in state σˆn−1.
Once it does so, it invokes verify(σˆn−1,msgn, Φˆn) to try again. To support this backtracking, upon
a successful return from verify(σ+n−2, msgn−1, Φn−1) in line 115, it is necessary to save the existing
algorithm state (i.e., its Live set and the states of the nodes it contains) to enable it to be restarted from
where it left off. If msgn−1 is a server-to-client message (and so Π+n−1 6= Πn−1), then backtracking is
performed similarly, except the computation of verify(σ+n−2, msgn−1, Φn−1) is resumed only after all
possible extensions Πˆ+n−1 of Πn−1 have been exhausted, i.e., each corresponding verify(σˆ
+
n−1, msgn,
Φˆn) has failed.
The most significant performance optimization that we have implemented for backtracking is a
method to detect the equivalence of some symbolic states, i.e., for which execution from these states
(on the same inputs) will behave identically. If the states σn−1 and σˆn−1 are equivalent and if a
valid client could not send msgn after reaching σn−1, then equivalently it could not send msgn after
reaching σˆn−1. So, for example, if σˆn−1 was reached due to backtracking after verify(σn−1, msgn, Φn)
failed, then the new execution prefix Πˆn−1 that produces σˆn−1 should be abandoned immediately
and backtracking should resume again.
The difficulty in establishing the equivalence of σn−1 and σˆn−1, if they are in fact equivalent, is
that they may not be syntactically equal. This lack of equality arises from at least two factors. The
first is that in our present implementation, the address spaces of the states σn−1 and σˆn−1 are not the
same, but rather are disjoint ranges of the virtual address space of the verifier. Maintaining disjoint
address spaces for symbolic states is useful to enable their addresses to be passed to external calls
(e.g., system calls) during symbolic execution. It also requires us to assume that the client program
execution is invariant to the range from which its addresses are drawn, but we believe this property
is true of the vast majority of well-behaved client applications (including the ones we use in our
evaluation).
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A second factor that may cause σn−1 and σˆn−1 to be syntactically distinct while still being
equivalent is that the different execution prefixes Πn−1 and Πˆn−1 leading to these states may induce
differences in their pointer values. Consider, for example, the trivial C function in Figure 4.2, which
reads an input character and then branches based on its value; in one branch, it allocates *buf1 and
then *buf2, and in the other branch, it allocates *buf2 and then *buf1. Even if the address spaces
of different states occupied the same ranges, and even if the memory allocator assigned memory
deterministically (as a function of the order and size of the allocations), the addresses of buf1 and
buf2 would be different in states that differ only because they explored different directions of
the symbolic branch if (c == ’x’). These states would nevertheless be equivalent, assuming
that the client application behavior is invariant to its state’s pointer values (again, a reasonable
assumption for well-behaved applications).
void foo(char **buf1, char **buf2) {
char c;
c = getchar();
if (c == ’x’) {
*buf1 = (char *) malloc(10);
*buf2 = (char *) malloc(10);
} else {
*buf2 = (char *) malloc(10);
*buf1 = (char *) malloc(10);
}
}
Figure 4.2. Example code that may induce different pointer values for variables in otherwise equivalent
states.
To detect equivalent states σn−1 and σˆn−1 that are syntactically unequal due to the above causes,
we built a procedure to walk the memory of two states in tandem. The memory of each is traversed
in lock-step and in a canonical order, starting from each concrete pointer in its global variables
(including the stack pointer) and following each concrete pointer to the memory to which it points.
(Pointers are recognized by their usage.) Concrete, non-pointer values traversed simultaneously
are compared for equality; unequal values cause the traversal to terminate with an indication that
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the states are not equivalent.2 Similarly, structural differences in simultaneously traversed memory
regions (e.g., regions of different sizes, or a concrete value in one where a symbolic value is in
the other) terminate the traversal. Symbolic memory locations encountered at the same point in
the traversal of each state are given a common name, and this common name is propagated to
any constraints that involve that location. Finally, equivalence of these constraints is determined
by using a constraint solver to determine if each implies the other. If so, the states are declared
equivalent.
4.6 Configurations
Thus far, we have not specified how Φn is populated from the set Φ of medoids resulting
from clustering the execution fragments witnessed during training (Section 4.2). We consider two
possibilities for populating Φn in this chapter.
4.6.1 Default configuration
The default algorithm configuration constructs Φn from the contents of msgn. If the closest
training message is at distance m from msgn, for a measure of distance described below, then the
algorithm computes the set Mαn of training messages less than distance αm from msgn, for a fixed
parameter α ≥ 1. (In Section 4.7, we use α = 1.25.) An execution fragment φ is eligible to be included
in Φn if (i) φ is the medoid of some cluster for which there is an indicator message msg ∈ Mαn ,
and (ii) φ begins at the instruction to which the program counter in σ+n−1 points, where σ
+
n−1 is the
symbolic state that will be passed to verify along with msgn and Φn. Then, Φn is set to include all
eligible fragments up to a limit β; if there are more than β eligible fragments, then Φn consists of an
arbitrary subset of size β. (In Section 4.7, we use β = 8.)
The distance measure between messages that we use in our evaluation in Section 4.7 is simply
byte edit distance between messages of the same directionality (i.e., between server-to-client mes-
sages or between client-to-server messages). If msg and msgn do not have the same directionality,
2The state could still be equivalent if the differing concrete values do not influence execution, but our method does not
detect the states as equivalent in this case.
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then we define their distance to be∞, so that only training messages of the same directionality as
msgn are included in Mαn .
4.6.2 Hint configuration
The “hint” configuration requires that the client software has been adapted to work with the
verifier to facilitate its verification. In this configuration, the client piggybacks a hint on msgn that
is a direct indication of the execution fragment it executed prior to sending msgn. This extra hint,
however, increases the bandwidth utilized by client-to-server messages, and so it is important that
we minimize this cost.
Specifically, in this configuration, the client software has knowledge of the clustering used by
the verifier, as described in Section 4.2.2. (For example, the server sends it this information when
the client connects.) The client records its own execution path and, when sending a client-to-server
message msgn, maps its immediately preceding execution fragment to its closest cluster in the
verifier’s clustering (using edit distance on execution fragments). The client then includes the index
of this cluster within msgn as a “hint” to the verifier. The server extracts the cluster index from
msgn and provides this to the verifier.
Intuitively, the medoid φ of the indicated cluster should be used as the sole element of the set
Φn, but only if φ begins at the instruction pointed to by the program counter of the symbolic state
σ+n−1 to be provided to verify as input.3 For the applications we evaluate in Section 4.7, however, we
adapt this idea slightly and interpret this cluster index within the set of all clusters whose fragments
begin at that instruction and end at a send. Then, Φn is set to contain only the medoid of this cluster.
(If the cluster index exceeds the number of clusters whose fragments begin at that instruction, or if
msgn is a server-to-client message, then the default approach above is used to create Φn, instead.)
In this way, the cluster hint can be conveyed in exactly dlog2 ke extra bits on each client-to-server
message, where k is the number of clusters allowed by the verifier in its third level of clustering
(see Section 4.2.2). While sending a hint does increase bandwidth cost, it does so minimally; e.g., in
3An alternative is for the verifier to backtrack immediately if φ begins at a different instruction, since in that case, σ+n−1 is
apparently not representative of the client’s state when it executed the fragment leading up to it sending msgn. For the
applications we evaluate in Section 4.7, however, backtracking usually incurred more verification cost even in this case.
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Section 4.7, we consider k = 256 (1 byte per client-to-server message) and k ≤ 65536 (2 bytes per
client-to-server message).
Despite the fact that the client sends the hint to the server, the client remains completely
untrusted in this configuration. The hint it provides is simply to accelerate verification of a legitimate
client, and providing an incorrect hint does not substantially impact the verifier’s cost for declaring
the client compromised.
4.7 Evaluation
To evaluate our technique, we built a prototype that uses the klee [17] symbolic execution engine
as a foundation. Our implementation includes approximately 1000 modified source lines of code
(SLOC) in klee and additional 10,000 SLOC in C++. That said, at present we have not completed
the client-side implementation of the hint configuration described in Section 4.6, and so we instead
simulate the client-side hint in our evaluation here. We stress, therefore, that while we accurately
measure the verifier’s performance in both the default and hint configurations, the additional client
overheads implied by the hint configuration are not reported here. The experiments described in
this section were performed on a system with 24GB of RAM and a 2.93GHz processor (Intel X5670).
We limit our evaluation to the verifier’s performance. By design, our verification algorithm has
no false positives — i.e., if a message trace is declared to be inconsistent with the sanctioned client
software, then it really is (though this is subject to an assumption discussed in Section 4.5). Similarly,
the only source of false negatives arises from the limited fidelity of the constraints used to model
values returned by components with which the client software interacts (e.g., the OS). We could
improve that fidelity by subjecting these components to symbolic execution, as well, but here we
limit symbolic execution to the client software proper.
To evaluate performance, we apply our algorithm to verify behavior of legitimate clients of two
open-source games, namely XPilot and TetriNET (described in Section 4.7). We limit our attention
to legitimate clients since this is the case in which we make a contribution; i.e., our approach is
designed to validate legal behavior more quickly than previous work, but confirms illegal behavior
in time comparable to what the previous technique in Chapter 3 would achieve. We employ these
games for our evaluation for numerous reasons: they are complex and so pose challenging test
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cases for our technique; they are open-source (and our tools require access to source code); and
games is a domain that warrants behavior verification due to the invalid-command cheats to which
they are often subjected [90].
In our evaluation we observe two data points for each msgn in a message trace, verification cost
and verification delay. The verification cost for message msgn, denoted cost(n), accounts for all time
spent in verify(σn−1, msgn, Φn). This is measured as the wall-clock time from the algorithm takes to
determine that msgn is valid.4 Our second data point for evaluation is the verification delay, which
is the delay in time between the arrival of message msgn at the server (where a server-to-client
message “arrives” when it is sent) and the discovery of an execution prefix Πn that is consistent
with msg0, . . ., msgn. Delay differs from verification time by representing the fact that verification
for msgn cannot begin until after verification for msgn−1 completes. To formally define delay, we
first define the verification completion time, Tcomp(), for msgn inductively as follows:
Tcomp(0) = cost(0)
Tcomp(n) = max{Tarr (n),Tcomp(n− 1)}+ cost(n)
where Tarr (n) is the wall-clock time when msgn arrived at the verifier. Since the verification of
msgn cannot begin until after both (i) it is received at the verifier, at time Tarr (n) and (ii) the
previous messages msg0, . . . ,msgn−1 have completed verification, at time Tcomp(n− 1). Tcomp(n)
is calculated as the cost cost(n) incurred after both conditions (i) and (ii) are met. Then, the delay of
msgn is delay(n) = Tcomp(n)− Tarr (n).
XPilot
XPilot is an open-source, multi-player, client-server game that has been developed in many
revisions over more than 15 years including, e.g., a version for the iPhone that was released in July
2009. The version we used in our evaluation is XPilot NG (XPilot Next Generation) version 4.7.2. Its
client consists of roughly 100,000 SLOC. Beyond this, the scope of symbolic execution included all
4If backtracking occurs, that time is included in the verification time of the associated round, i.e., the verification time for
msgn may include the total wall clock time of more than one instance of verify.
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needed libraries except Xlib, whose functions were replaced with minimal stubs, so that the game
could be run without display output. Moreover, uClibc was used in lieu of the GNU C library.
In the game, the user causes her spaceship to navigate a two-dimensional world occupied by
obstacles, objects such as power-ups that the user can collect by navigating her spaceship over them,
and both fixed and mobile hostiles that can fire on her ship (some of which are ships controlled by
other players). Each player’s goal is to earn the highest score. Despite its “2D” graphics, the game
incorporates sophisticated physics simulation; e.g., ships with more fuel have greater mass and
thus greater inertia.
Upon startup, the XPilot client reads local files that, e.g., define the world map. (Our evaluation
assumes that these initialization files are available to the verifier, as they must be to the server, as
well.) The XPilot client then enters an event loop that receives user input and server messages,
processes them (including rendering suitable changes on the client’s display), and sends an update
to the server. These updates can include information about the current status of the user’s ship’s
shields (whether they are up or down), weapons (whether any are firing), position, orientation,
acceleration, etc. Various limitations imposed by the client, such as that a client cannot both have its
shields up and be firing at the same time, are obvious targets for a user to override by modifying
the game client in order to cheat. Our behavior verification technique will detect such game cheats
automatically.
In Chapter 3 it was necessary to modify the XPilot client in various small ways to make its
analysis tractable. We used this modified version in our evaluations in this chapter, as well, though
to illustrate certain improvements enabled by our technique, we reverted an important modification.
Recall that in Chapter 3, we inserted bounds to limit the number of user inputs that would be
processed in any given event-loop round, since otherwise the event loop could theoretically process
an unbounded number of such inputs. This unboundedness, in turn, would cause symbolic
execution to explore an arbitrary numbers of corresponding input-processing loop iterations. By
inserting bounds, we rectified this problem but introduced a potential source of false positives, if
the deployed client software were execute more than the bounded number of input events in a given
event-loop round. Here we removed these inserted limits so as to eliminate this risk of false positives
and also to highlight the power of training our verifier on previous executions. After removing
these limits, these input-processing loops could theoretically iterate an arbitrary number of times,
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but nevertheless our verifier does not explore paths including increasingly large numbers of such
iterations until it is done exploring paths with numbers of iterations similar to those encountered
in the training runs.
TetriNET
TetriNET is a multi-player version of the popular single-player Tetris game. In the Tetris game,
one player controls a rectangular gameboard of squares, at the top of which a tetromino appears
and starts to “fall” toward the bottom at a constant rate. Each tetromino is of a size to occupy four
connected grid squares orthogonally and has one of seven shapes. The tetromino retains its shape
and size as it falls, but the user can reorient the tetromino as it falls by pressing keys to rotate it.
The user can also move the tetromino to the left or right by pressing other keys. Once the tetromino
lands on top of another tetromino or the bottom of the grid, it can no longer be moved or rotated.
At that point, another tetromino appears at the top of the grid and begins to fall. Whenever a full
row of the gameboard is occupied by tetrominos, the row disappears (potentially fracturing any
tetrominos occupying a portion of it) and all rows above the removed row are shifted downward.
TetriNET differs from Tetris by adding an empty row to all other players’ grids when this occurs. The
goal of the game is for a player to place as many tetrominos as possible before no more can enter
her gameboard, and a player wins the multiplayer version by playing longer than other players.
The TetriNET client is structured as an event loop that processes user inputs and advances each
tetromino in its fall down the gameboard. Only once a tetromino has landed in its resting place
does the game client inform the server of the location of the tetromino and whether its placement
caused any rows to be deleted (and if so, which ones). The server does not validate the client’s claim
that the condition for deleting the row was met (i.e., that the row was full), and so the game is very
vulnerable to invalid-command cheats. Again, our technique will automatically detect such cheats.
The TetriNET client version (0.11) that we used in our evaluation is 5000 SLOC. As in XPilot,
the scope of symbolic execution also included all needed libraries, though again the display output
library (ncurses) was disabled using minimal stub functions and uClibc was used in place of the
GNU C library. Despite its small size, a single event-loop iteration in the TetriNET client permits
an unbounded number of user inputs to rotate or horizontally shift the tetromino, which presents
problems for symbolic execution analogous to those that led us to cap the number of inputs in a
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single XPilot event-loop iteration for exhausitive symbolic client verification in Chapter 3. As such,
in the experimentation with TetriNET, we also limited gameplay so that a tetromino could be placed
only at a location for which only empty squares were above it, so as to limit the number of user inputs
needed for a tetromino placement to half the width of the gameboard plus the number of possible
tetromino rotations — nine user inputs in total. We emphasize that none of these restrictions are
employed in this chapter, and again the ability of our algorithm to verify the behavior of a TetriNET
client in its unconstrained form illustrates its strengths.
Evaluation of our verification algorithm requires traces of gameplay for both training and
testing. For TetriNET, we generated 20 traces of manual gameplay, each of 240 messages in length
(which corresponds to roughly 6.5 minutes of gameplay). For XPilot, we generated 40 traces of
manual gameplay, each consisting of 2100 messages (roughly 70 seconds of gameplay).
4.7.1 Case Study: TetriNET
Figure 4.3 shows TetriNET verification costs. Figure 4.3 includes plots for both the default and
hint configurations, as well as for clustering parameter values k = 256 and k = 3790; the latter case
ensured a single execution fragment per cluster.
The numbers represented in Figure 4.3 were obtained by a 20-fold cross validation of the
TetriNET traces; i.e., in each test, one of the traces was selected for testing, and the remainder
were used for training. Specifically, Figure 4.3 shows the distribution of verification costs per
message, binned into ten-message bins, across all 20 traces. So, for example, the boxplot labeled “0”
shows the distribution of verification costs for messages msg0, . . . ,msg9 in the 20 traces. The data
point for message msgn accounts for all time spent in verify(σ+n−1, msgn, Φn) and any immediately
preceding preprocessing step (see Section 4.3.1), including any backtracking into those functions
that occur. (That said, backtracking in TetriNET is very rare.) In each boxplot, the “box” shows the
first, second (median) and third quartiles, and its whiskers extend to ±1.5 times the interquartile
range. Additional outlier points are shown as bullets. Overlaid on each boxplot is a diamond (♦)
that shows the average of the data points.
Several things are worth noting about Figure 4.3. In all cases, the distribution of verification
costs is largely unaffected by the message index, i.e., where in the trace the message appears. This
confirms that our implementation is mostly free from sources of increasing verification expense as
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traces grow longer. This figure also confirms that more fine-grained clustering (k = 3790) leads
to faster verification times than coarse grained (k = 256). Fine-grain clustering, however, results
in greater bandwidth use in the hint configuration; k = 3790 implies an overhead of 12 bits or, if
sent as two bytes, an average of 17% bandwidth increase per client-to-server message, in contrast to
only 9% per client-to-server message for k = 256. Not surprisingly, the hint configuration generally
outperforms the default.
Figure 4.3 also suggests that our algorithm is, for the large majority of messages, fast enough
to verify valid TetriNET gameplay at a pace faster than the game itself: the average verification
cost per message, regardless of configuration or clustering granularity, is easily beneath the inter-
message times of roughly 1.6s. That said, there are two issues that require further exploration. First,
there are messages that induce verification cost in excess of 10s or even 100s, which unfortunately
makes it impossible to reliably keep pace with gameplay. Nevertheless, as an optimization over
previous work for verifying message traces, and as a data reduction technique to eliminate some
traces (or portions thereof) from the need to log and analyze oﬄine, our technique still holds
considerable promise. Second, and working in favor of this promise, is the slack time between the
arrival of messages that gives verification the opportunity to catch up to the pace of gameplay after
a particularly difficult message verification.
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Figure 4.3. TetriNET verification costs. Cross-validation over 20 traces. Boxplot at x shows verification costs
for messages msgx, . . ., msgx+9 in each trace (after training on the other traces). “♦” shows the average.
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Figure 4.4. TetriNET verification delays. Cross-validation over 20 traces. Boxplot at x shows verification
delays for messagesmsgx, . . ., msgx+9 in each trace (after training on the other traces). “♦” shows the average.
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To shed light on these issues, Figure 4.4 instead plots the distributions of per-message verification
delay between the arrival of message msgn at the server (where a server-to-client message “arrives”
when it is sent) and the discovery of an execution prefix Πn that is consistent with msg0, . . ., msgn.
Delay (Figure 4.4) differs from verification cost (Figure 4.3) by representing the fact that verification
for msgn cannot begin until after that for msgn−1 completes. So, for example, the rightmost boxplot
in each graph provides insight into how long after the completion of the message trace (in real time)
that it took for verification for the whole trace to complete.
One item to note about these graphs is that for the hint configuration with k = 3790 (Fig-
ure 4.4(d)), the median of the rightmost boxplot is virtually zero — i.e., the most common case is
that verification kept pace with gameplay. This can occur even if verification falls behind at some
point in the game, since verification commonly “catches up” after falling behind. This is illustrated,
for example, in the generally downward slope of consecutive outlier points in Figure 4.4(d). That
said, the cumulative effect of verification delays in the other configurations is more costly, e.g.,
causing verification to lag behind gameplay by more than 100 seconds by the end of a 240-message
trace in the median case in the default configuration (Figure 4.4(c)).
A breakdown of verification costs for TetriNET is shown in Figure 4.5. In our TetriNET exper-
iments, more than 50% of the verification cost is spent in klee, interpreting client instructions.
Therefore, optimizations that interpret instructions only selectively (e.g., [23]) may be a significant
optimization for our tool. The majority of the remaining time is spent in insertions and deletions on
Live and in computing edit distance, both to update the edit distance for each path when a symbolic
branch is reached and to compute distances between messages. A very small fraction of time in our
TetriNET experiments is devoted to equivalent state detection (Section 4.5) or in constraint solving.
In Figure 4.5, constraint solving includes not only the time spent by stp (the default solver used by
klee), but also preprocessing techniques to make queries to stp more efficient and a canonicalization
step (similar to Visser et al. [83]) to improve the hit rate on cached results for previous queries to
stp. These optimizations significantly reduce the overall constraint solving time.
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Figure 4.5. Percentage of time spent in each component of the verifier.
4.7.2 Case Study: XPilot
XPilot poses a significant challenge for verification because its pace is so fast. The tests described
here use an XPilot configuration that resulted in an average of 32 messages per second. The
verification costs per message vary somewhat less for XPilot than they did for TetriNET, as shown
in Figure 4.6. Recall that each boxplot in Figure 4.6 represents 100× 40 points, versus only 10× 20
in Figure 4.3. As such, though there are larger numbers of outliers in Figure 4.6, they constitute a
smaller fraction of the data points.
The median per-message verification cost of XPilot when clustering is fine-grained (k = 475,
which implied a single execution fragment per cluster) is quite comparable to that in TetriNET, as can
be seen by comparing Figure 4.6(c) and Figure 4.6(d) to Figure 4.3(c) and Figure 4.3(d), respectively.
However, XPilot verification is considerably faster with coarse clustering, see Figure 4.6(a) versus
Figure 4.3(a) and Figure 4.6(b) versus Figure 4.3(b). Our definition of k = 256 as “coarse” clustering
was dictated by the goal of limiting the bandwidth overhead to one byte per client-to-server message
in the hint configuration. The better performance of XPilot verification for coarse clustering versus
TetriNET is at least partly because k = 256 is closer to fine clustering (k = 475) in the case of XPilot
than it is for TetriNET (k = 3790). In the hint configuration, k = 256 increases bandwidth use by
XPilot client-to-server messages by 2%, and k = 475 (9 bits, sent in two bytes) increases it by 4%.
Though the median per-message verification cost of XPilot is generally as good or better than
that for TetriNET, the faster pace of XPilot makes it much more difficult for verification to keep pace
with the game. This effect is shown in Figure 4.7. As shown in this figure, none of the configurations
or clustering granularities permitted verification to keep up with gameplay, and the best default
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configuration (k = 475) included one run that required 8 minutes past the end of the trace to
complete its verification (see Figure 4.7(c)). Consequently, for an application as fast-paced and as
complex as XPilot, our algorithm does not eliminate the need to save traces for post hoc analysis.
Nevertheless, we stress that our algorithm accomplishes — even if with some delay — what is
for the approach in Chapter 3 completely intractable. That is, recall that the approach in Chapter 3
utilized a restricted version of XPilot in which the number of user inputs per event loop iteration was
artificially limited; we have removed that limitation here (see Section 4.7). With these restrictions
removed, the previous approach is inherently unbounded for verifying some messages, since it
seeks to eagerly find all paths that could explain that message, of which there could be infinitely
many. Our approach, in contrast, succeeds in verifying all messages in these logs in bounded time
and with per-message cost averaging under 100ms in all configurations (Figure 4.6).
A fractional breakdown of verification costs for XPilot are shown in Figure 4.5. While a majority
of the cost is still contributed by interpreting client instructions in klee, the majority is smaller in
the case of XPilot than it was for TetriNET. For XPilot, equivalent state detection (Section 4.5) plays a
more prominent role than it did for TetriNET, in part due to XPilot’s more complex memory structure.
Moreover, due to the substantially more complex constraints generated by XPilot, constraint solving
plays a much more prominent role than it did for TetriNET.
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Figure 4.6. XPilot verification costs. Cross-validation over 40 traces. Boxplot at x shows verification cost for
messages msgx, . . ., msgx+99 in each trace (after training on the other traces). “♦” shows the average.
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Figure 4.7. XPilot verification delays. Cross-validation over 40 traces. Boxplot at x shows verification delays
for messages msgx, . . ., msgx+99 in each trace (after training on the other traces). “♦” shows the average.
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4.8 Summary
In this chapter we have presented a novel algorithm to enable a server to verify that the behavior
of a client in a client-server application is consistent with the sanctioned client software. The central
challenge that must be overcome in achieving this goal is that the server does not know all of the
inputs to the client (e.g., user inputs) that induced its behavior, and in some domains (see [67]) the
additional bandwidth utilized by sending those inputs to the server is undesirable. We therefore
developed a technique by which the verifier “solves” for whether there exist user inputs that could
explain the client behavior. We overcome the scaling challenges of this approach by leveraging
execution history to guide a search for paths through the client program that could produce the
messages received by the server. This approach enables us to achieve dramatic cost savings in
the common case of a legitimate client, and by allowing minimal additional bandwidth use, we
can improve performance even further. In the best configuration of our algorithm, verification of
legitimate TetriNET gameplay often keeps pace with the game itself. In other cases, verification
efficiency is adequate to practically handle client applications that previous work was forced to
restrict to make its analysis tractable. We believe that the manner in which we leverage execution
history can be useful in other applications of symbolic execution, as well.
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CHAPTER 5: PARALLEL CLIENT VERIFICATION
Symbolic client verification can be used to build a verifier that validates traffic received from
remote clients. This technique can identify cheating players in multiplayer networked games or
identify other types of malicious behavior in distributed systems. Client verification is potentially
very useful, especially if the validity result can be computed quickly. Rather than logging network
traffic for verification off-line, a fast verifier could be configured to validate traffic as it arrives at the
server. The contributions of this chapter are motivated by the goal of keeping a window of attack
that is as small as possible, or in other words, minimizing the time it takes the verifier to return
a validity result for a given message. The techniques developed thus far in this dissertation have
not achieved efficiency levels that would allow a verifier to be placed on the critical path of serving
client requests.
At any point in time during verification, there are many possible paths of exploration; choosing
the right path of exploration improves the latency of the verifier’s result. In the previous chapter we
demonstrated that a combination of training data and edit distance metrics can be used to guide the
verifier’s exploration. This approach is successful because it prioritizes exploration on paths that are
more likely to lead to success. However, this algorithm alone cannot keep pace with all of our client
application case studies. For a long-running or even continuous client-server session, if the average
time to verify a message is greater than the average time between message arrivals, the verifier
falls further and further behind. In this chapter, we demonstrate a technique to push forward on
multiple paths of exploration in parallel, resulting in significant performance improvements.
The ability to keep pace with client traffic is important because it opens up new avenues for
using our client verification technique. If the verification is fast enough, it can operate in-line,
allowing each client-to-server message to be verified as being consistent with the sanctioned client
software, before it is processed by the server. An in-line verification configuration would add some
amount of latency to the client-to-server network traffic, but that trade-off may be very acceptable
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Figure 5.1. Off-line and in-line client verification.
in some situations, especially if the added latency is low or if the cost of invalid command attacks
is very high. Figure 5.1 shows examples of off-line and in-line verifier configurations; an in-line
configuration can drop a malicious message before it has time to propagate to the server. The
advantages of in-line client verification include:
• Elimination of the need for logging network traffic for later verification, reducing storage
costs.
• Better quality of service for other players in multiplayer games; cheaters would be removed
more quickly, improving the game quality for honest players.
• Identification of invalid command messages before they are processed by potentially vulnerable
server software, crucially saving server operators from potential damage to infrastructure or
the leakage of private or sensitive data.
5.1 Goals and Background
Our goal is to rapidly identify clients that from the server’s perspective are operating sanctioned
client software. In this chapter we demonstrate that we can achieve verification results that can keep
pace with our case study applications with a modified version of our verification algorithm. We de-
scribe modifications to our client verification technique to utilize thread-level parallelism. Although
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Figure 5.2. Verifier Architecture
using training data can reduce the total number of execution states that must be explored, we also
wish to further reduce the time between message arrival and the verification result. Concurrent
exploration can achieve this result.
The outline of the rest of this chapter is as follows. We will first review the client verification
problem and describe the architecture of our verifier. We then review multi-threading primitives
and describe an algorithm for parallel client verification in detail. Following that are an overview of
implementation level details and then an evaluation on two client case studies, TetriNET and XPilot.
5.1.1 Client Verification Overview
We now state our assumptions, describe the architecture of the verifier and the client verification
problem.
Assumptions
As in the previous chapter, we are concerned with verifying a client that generates a message
trace, msg0, msg1, . . ., msgn, some sent by the client and some sent by the server. Furthermore, as
before, we assume the software running on the remote client is single-threaded and that the verifier
is provided with an ordering of messages according to the client’s perspective.
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Architecture and Assumptions
In previous chapters, we have described the verifier architecture shown in Figure 5.2. The
verifier operates by exploring possible execution paths the client may have taken to find a path
that “explains” a given message trace. If no such path can be found, the message trace is declared
invalid. The verifier uses symbolic execution to explore possible client paths. To operate, the verifier
requires three inputs; a message trace, msg0,msg1, . . . ,msgn, which will be verified; the source code
for some sanctioned client software, compiled into an intermediate representation (IR) that can
be executed by a symbolic virtual machine; and a set of training data for the client bitcode under
verification that is used to guide the selection of possible paths of execution. The message trace is
incrementally fed to the verifier as it arrives at the server and the verifier outputs if the message
trace it has processed thus far can be explained by an execution path in the software that the client
is expected to be running.
Client Verification Definition
We formally define the task of the verifier using the same definitions as Chapter 4. The verifier’s
algorithm determines whether there exists an execution prefix of the client that is consistent with
the messages msg0,msg1, . . ., msgn. Specifically, an execution prefix Πn is a sequence of client
instructions that begins at the client entry point and follows valid branching behavior in the client
program. We define Πn to be consistent with msg0, msg1, . . ., msgn, if the network send and recv
instructions1 in Πn number n+ 1 and these network instructions match msg0, msg1, . . ., msgn by
direction—i.e., if msg i is a client-to-server message (respectively, server-to-client message), then the
i-th network I/O instruction is a send (respectively, recv)—and if the branches taken in Πn were
possible. Consistency of Πn with msg0, msg1, . . ., msgn requires that the conjunction of all symbolic
postconditions at send instructions along Πn be satisfiable, once concretized using the contents of
messages msg0, msg1, . . ., msg i sent and received on that path.
The verifier attempts to validate the sequence msg0, msg1, . . . incrementally, by verifying the
sequence msg0, msg1, . . ., msgn starting from an execution prefix Πn−1 found to be consistent with
1We abbreviate call instructions to POSIX select(), send() and recv() system calls (or their functional equivalents)
with the labels select, send and recv.
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msg0, msg1, . . ., msgn−1, and appending to it an execution fragment that yields an execution prefix Πn
consistent with msg0, msg1, . . ., msgn. Specifically, an execution fragment is a nonempty sequence of
client instructions (i) beginning at the client entry point, a select, or a send in the client software, (ii)
ending at a send or recv, and (iii) having no intervening send or recv instructions. This incremental
mechanic is important to note, as it is the key step in the verification algorithm that we describe.
By using an incremental construction, an entire execution prefix Πn can be constructed if a given
message trace was produced by a valid client. The verification algorithm operates as a step-by-step
construction of an execution prefix, because when verification begins, the verifier will only have a
single network message msg0.
Client Verification Backtracking
Suppose an execution prefix Πn−1 is consistent with a message trace up to message msgn−1. It
is possible for there to be no execution fragment that can be appended to produce an execution
prefix Πn that is consistent with the message trace extended by the next message to arrive, msgn.
Intuitively, a path of execution may exercise client state that precludes future client actions or
outputs from occurring. The verifier incrementally constructs an execution prefix in an optimistic
fashion. In many cases, there is more than one execution prefix consistent with a message trace,
but the verifier only needs to find one to show that a client is valid. When the verifier cannot find
an execution fragment that can be appended to Πn−1 to produce a Πn consistent with msg0, msg1,
. . ., msgn, then the verifier backtracks to find a new Πˆn−1 consistent with msg0, msg1, . . ., msgn−1
that can be extended with an execution fragment to yield a Πˆn consistent with msg0, msg1, . . .,
msgn. Only after all such attempts fail can the client behavior be declared invalid, which may take
substantial time. In practice, an “invalid” declaration usually comes by timeout on the verification
process. Our concern in this chapter is verifying the behavior of valid clients quickly, irrespective of
how long it requires to declare an invalid client as such.
5.2 Parallel Client Verification
We now present a verification algorithm that takes advantage of thread-level parallelism. At
a high level, the main work of verification is symbolically executing client code to produce an
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struct Node {
SymbolicState state;
ExecutionFragment path;
struct Node child[2];
}
(a) Node data structure
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Figure 5.3. Node data structure and node tree.
execution prefix (Section 5.1.1) for a given message sequence. The algorithm that we describe
outlines the steps required to produce an execution prefix Πn from an execution prefix Πn−1. In
practice, many possible paths of execution need to be explored to produce an execution fragment.
Incomplete paths will be dropped upon reaching unsatisfiable states and candidate execution
fragments will be dropped if the network action at the end of the fragment is not consistent with
the message trace. Our parallel client verification algorithm achieves significant improvements in
performance by using thread-level parallelism to explore candidate execution fragments.
5.2.1 Algorithm Definitions
We now define the data structures used by the algorithm. A state σ represents a snapshot of
execution in the symbolic virtual machine, including all constraints (path conditions) and memory
objects, which includes the contents (symbolic or concrete) of registers, the stack and the heap.
The verifier produces state σn by symbolically executing the instruction sequence represented by
execution prefix Πn.
The algorithm builds and maintains binary tree, consisting of Node objects, shown in Fig-
ure 5.3(a). This tree is rooted with a state σn−1 and an empty path. Figure 5.3(b) shows an example
tree, with a root node containing σn−1. (The remaining node types will be described later in the
algorithm description.) The two children of a node in the tree extend Πn−1, the path represented
by σn−1, through the next symbolic branch (i.e., branch instruction with a symbolic condition).
One child state holds a constraint that maintains that the branch condition implies false, and the
other child state holds a constraint that indicates that the branch condition is true. The algorithm
succeeds by finding a fragment with which to extend Πn−1 to yield Πn if, upon extending a path,
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it encounters a network I/O instruction that yields a state with constraints that do not contradict
msgn being the network I/O instruction’s message.
We define a set of training data Φ to be a set of execution fragments and associated message
data, observed and collected via execution of the client prior to verification. During verification,
the verifier selects a subset of execution fragments Φn ⊆ Φ, for verification of msgn. The set Φn is
used prioritize nodes in the node tree rooted at σn−1. This prioritization technique is detailed in
Chapter 4.
5.2.2 Key Insights
The driving goal of our algorithm is to enable concurrent exploration of multiple states in the
node tree. The sooner the algorithm can explore and then eliminate candidate paths, the sooner it
can find a valid execution fragment. We designed the parallel verification algorithm to use multiple
threads; it uses a single thread to manage the node tree, a single thread to select the training
data subset, and several worker threads, each assigned to a single node in the node tree at time.
Figure 5.3(b) shows an example assignment of four workers to multiple nodes in a node tree. In our
design and experiments the number of worker threads NumWorkers is a fixed parameter provided to
the verifier. Because the verification task is largely CPU-bound, it is in our experience not beneficial
to use more worker threads than the number of logical CPU cores, and in some cases, fewer worker
threads than cores are necessary. The main objective of our design is to get “out of the way” of the
worker threads. What follows are the high level features of the design.
• Concurrent exploration of execution fragments: The most important contribution of the
algorithm is concurrent exploration of execution fragments rooted at σn−1. This is enabled
by a multi-threaded symbolic execution engine (detailed in Section 5.3). As designed, the
algorithm explores only execution fragments starting from one state σn−1 corresponding
to one execution prefix Πn−1. Although searching from multiple execution prefixes is not
fundamentally impossible, our implementation of backtracking requires all worker threads to
be exploring fragments in the same node tree.
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• Non-blocking node tree management: Operations on the node tree operate asynchronously
from the worker threads. This is done so that worker threads do not have to block on operations
that interact with shared data structures.
• Non-blocking training data selection: The parallel verification algorithm extends the method
of training data selection described in Chapter 4. As before, when msgn arrives, the verifier
selects from a set of execution fragments Φ, produced during training, that are deemed likely
to be similar to the fragment executed by the client leading up to it sending or receiving
msgn; this subset of execution fragments is denoted Φn. Depending on the size of the training
data and granularity of clustering, the selection of Φn may take a significant amount of time.
The parallel verification algorithm asynchronously selects Φn in a separate thread so that
the exploration from σn−1 is not blocked and can begin before Φn is available. Once Φn has
been computed, the node selection algorithm switches from naive breadth-first search to an
edit-distance search using the selected subset of execution fragments (Φn).
5.2.3 Multi-threading primitives
The description of our algorithm requires the definition of primitives used in the dynamic multi-
threading model [27]. These primitives are spawn, sync and atomic. The keyword spawn must
precede a procedure call and has semantics such that the next statement may continue execution
concurrently with the spawned procedure. In other words, spawn indicates the creation of a child
thread that will execute the declared procedure until completion, at which point the child thread
will terminate. The second keyword sync denotes that the parent procedure will wait to proceed to
the next statement until all spawned child threads have finished execution. The keyword atomic is
necessary because, when executing in a multi-threaded environment, multiple threads may access
the same memory locations at once. In order for concurrent threads to safely change such a value, a
thread that loads and modifies a variable should execute these operations atomically, in isolation
from the rest the threads. We use the keyword atomic in our algorithm description to indicate
that an operation or sequence of operations must execute with the appearance to other threads
of occurring instantaneously. Note that this is a simplification of the underlying implementation,
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which may make use of compare-and-swap operations, mutexes and condition variables to achieve
thread-safe memory operations.
Algorithm Parallel Client Verification
300: procedure ParallelVerify(σn−1, msgn, Φ)
301: Active← 0 . Number of active threads
302: atomic QR ← makeNodeQueue() . Nodes for worker threads to execute
303: atomic QA ← makeNodeQueue() . Nodes created by worker threads
304: atomic Valid← ⊥ . Will be set to a valid path if successful
305: atomic Finished← false . Instructs all threads to halt
306: Φn ← {} . Training for set msgn
307: spawn TrainingSelector(msgn, Φ, Φn)
308: spawn NodeScheduler(σn−1, Φn, QR, QA, Active, Finished)
309: for 1 to NumWorkers do
310: spawn VerifyWorker(msgn, QR, QA, Active, Finished, Valid)
311: sync . Wait for all child threads
312: return Valid . Return result, ⊥ or σn
Figure 5.4. Main procedure for parallel client verification.
5.2.4 Details of parallel verification algorithm
The algorithm for verifying a client-to-server message using thread-level parallelism is shown
in Figure 5.4. This algorithm, denoted ParallelVerify, takes as input the symbolic state σn−1 resulting
from execution of Πn−1 from the client entry point on message trace msg0, . . . ,msgn−1, the next
message msgn; and the complete training fragment set Φ. Its output is either an execution fragment
that can be appended to Πn−1 to make Πn that is consistent with msg0, . . ., msgn, or no solution
(⊥). The latter case indicates failure and, more specifically, that there is no execution prefix that can
extend Πn−1 to make Πn that is consistent with msg0, . . ., msgn−1. This will induce backtracking to
search for another Πˆn−1 that is consistent with msg0, . . ., msgn−1, which the verifier will then try to
extend to find a Πn consistent with msg0, . . ., msgn.
The algorithm operates in a parent thread that spawns NumWorkers + 2 child threads; this
includes one thread to select training data, one thread to manage scheduling of nodes for execution,
and NumWorkers worker threads to explore candidate execution fragments. We outline in detail the
operation of algorithm ParallelVerify below.
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Initialization: First, variables that will be passed to the algorithm sub-procedures are initialized
(Lines 301–305). This includes a counter Active that tracks the number of active workers
(301), two empty Node queues QR and QA (301–303), an object Valid that will be set to a valid
execution fragment if the algorithm is successful (304) and a boolean Finished that will be set
to true when the algorithm reaches a stop condition (305).
Training Set Selection Thread: Next, on line 307, a thread is spawned for TrainingSelector. This
procedure selects a set of training fragments Φn ⊆ Φ from the set of all training fragments
Φ based on the contents of the message msgn. The details of this algorithm are outlined in
Chapter 4. The important change here is that this algorithm is run in separate thread. We will
outline the intuition behind this choice below.
Node Selection Thread: The algorithm then spawns a procedure that manages the selection of
nodes to execute next (308). The parameters to NodeScheduler are training fragment set Φn,
node queues QR and QA, counter Active and boolean Finished. Procedure NodeScheduler is
spawned in a child thread so that operations on the node tree do not block state exploration.
Verification Worker Threads: Finally, the algorithm spawns a fixed number of threads that execute
the VerifyWorker procedure (310). This procedure takes as parameters: network message msgn,
node queues QR and QA, counter Active, boolean Finished and execution path Valid.
Termination: Execution is blocked at the call sync until all child threads have exited due to a
termination condition, namely Finished = true. After all child threads have finished the
algorithm returns the result Valid, which is either set by a worker thread to an execution
fragment pi, that when appended to Πn−1 is consistent with msg0, . . ., msgn or on failure,
remains undefined ⊥ as initialized.
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Algorithm Parallel Client Verification (sub-procedures)
400: procedure NodeScheduler(σn−1, Φ, QR, QA, Active, Finished)
401: nd← makeNode()
402: nd.path← 〈〉; nd.state← σn−1
403: Live← {nd}
404: while Finished = false do
405: if |Live| > 0 and |QR| < (NumWorkers− Active) then
406: nd← SelectNode(Live, Φn)
407: atomic enqueue(QR, nd)
408: while |QA| > 0 do
409: atomic Live← Live ∪ {dequeue(QA)}
410: if |Live| = 0 and |QR| = 0 and |QA| = 0 and Active = 0 then
411: Finished← true
412:
413: procedure VerifyWorker(msgn, QR, QA, Active, Finished, Valid)
414: while Finished = false do
415: if |QR| > 0 then
416: atomic Active← Active + 1
417: atomic nd← dequeue(QR)
418: if nd 6= ⊥ then
419: pi ← nd.path ; σ ← nd.state
420: while isNetInstr(σ.next) = false and isSymbolicBranch(σ.next) = false do
421: pi ← pi ‖ 〈σ.next〉
422: σ ← execStep(σ)
423: if isNetInstr(σ.next) = true then
424: if ((σ.constraints ∧ σ.next.msg = msgn) 6⇒ false) then
425: Finished← true
426: Valid← σ . Success!
427: else if isSymbolicBranch(σ.next) = true then
428: nd.child0.state← [ execStep(σ) | σ.next.cond 7→ false ]
429: nd.child0.path← pi ‖ 〈nd.child0.state.next〉
430: if nd.child0.state.constraints 6⇒ false then
431: atomic enqueue(QA, nd.child0)
432: nd.child1.state← [ execStep(σ) | σ.next.cond 7→ true ]
433: nd.child1.path← pi ‖ 〈nd.child1.state.next〉
434: if nd.child1.state.constraints 6⇒ false then
435: atomic enqueue(QA, nd.child1)
436: atomic Active← Active− 1
Figure 5.5. Sub-procedures for parallel client verification.
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5.2.5 Details of parallel verification algorithm sub-procedures
We now describe in further detail the sub-procedures used by ParallelVerify and that are shown
in Figure 5.5. Recall that the parent procedure ParallelVerify spawns NumWorkers + 2 child threads
which run the procedures TrainingSelector, NodeScheduler and VerifyWorker. We omit the details of
TrainingSelector here, it is described in Chapter 4.
Management of nodes in NodeScheduler
ParallelVerify spawns a single thread to run the procedure NodeScheduler, shown starting on
Line 400 of Figure 5.5. This procedure manages the selection of nodes to execute next and maintains
the flow of nodes between worker threads. There are two queues of nodes, a “ready” queue QR and
an “added” queue QA. These queues are shared between the worker threads and the NodeScheduler
thread. Worker threads pull nodes from QR and push new nodes onto QA. There is only one
scheduler thread and one or more worker threads producing and consuming nodes from the queues
QR and QA; hence, QR is a single-producer-multi-consumer queue and QA is a multi-producer-
single-consumer queue. The goal of NodeScheduler is to keep QA empty and QR “full,” and we will
define what we mean by this below. Nodes are in one of four possible states, either actively being
explored inside VerifyWorker, stored in QR, stored in QA or stored in Live. A node at the front of
QR is the highest priority node not currently being explored. The nodes in QA are “infant” nodes
that have been created by VerifyWorker threads and need to be added to Live. The remaining nodes
stored in Live are the candidate nodes.
Upon initialization, the procedure NodeScheduler creates a root node and adds it to a set of
nodes called Live (401–403). After initialization, the procedure NodeScheduler has three cases of
execution. First, the condition on line 405 checks if Live is non-empty and if there are more worker
threads waiting to execute than nodes in QR, i.e., the queue QR is not “full”; if this condition is true,
we call SelectNode (see Chapter 4 for details) and atomically append the result to QR. Second, if
QA is non-empty, its members are dequeued and added to Live (408–409). Finally, the condition
on line 410 is only true if no worker threads are active, both queues are empty and there are no
remaining states to execute; when this condition is met, all paths of exploration rooted at σn−1 have
been exhaustively explored and a termination condition has been met. The boolean Finished will
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be set to true, forcing all threads to exit. The parent thread executing ParallelVerify will return ⊥ in
this case.
Building execution fragments in VerifyWorker
Shown starting on Line 413 of Figure 5.5, the procedure VerifyWorker does the main work of
client verification: stepping execution forward in the state σ of each node. Like NodeScheduler, the
procedure VerifyWorker runs inside of a while loop until the value of Finished is no longer equal to
false (414). Recall that the parent procedure ParallelVerify spawns multiple instances of VerifyWorker.
Whenever there is a node on the queue QR, the condition on line 415 will be true and the procedure
calls dequeue atomically. Note that even if |QR| = 0, multiple instances of VerifyWorker may call
dequeue, but only one will return a node, the rest will retrieve undefined (⊥) from dequeue.
If nd is not undefined, the algorithm proceeds to execute the state nd.state and extend the
associated path nd.path up to either the next network instruction (send or recv) or the next symbolic
branch (a branch instruction that is conditioned on a symbolic variable). The first case, stepping
execution on non-network / non-symbolic-branch instructions, executes in a while loop on lines
420–422. The current instruction is appended to the path and the procedure execStep is called,
which symbolically executes the next instruction in state σ. These lines, are where the majority
of the computation work is done by the verifier (see Figure 4.5 in Chapter 4) and viewed as the
“hot” path of the verification algorithm. The ability to concurrently step execution on multiple
states is where the largest performance benefits of parallelization are achieved. Note that calls to
execStep may invoke branch instructions, but these are non-symbolic branches. In the second case,
if the next instruction is send or recv and if the constraints σ.constraints accumulated so far with
the symbolic state σ do not contradict the possibility that the network I/O message σ.next.msg in
the next instruction σ.next is msgn (i.e., (σ.constraints ∧ σ.next.msg = msgn) 6⇒ false, line 423), then
the algorithm sets the termination value (Finished = true) and sets the return value of the parent
function (Valid ← pi ‖ 〈σ.next〉). All other threads of execution now exit because Finished = true
and the parent procedure ParallelVerify will return Valid, which is now an execution fragment that
meets the verifier’s goals successfully.
In the final case, (isSymbolicBranch(σ.next) = true), the algorithm is at a symbolic branch.
Thus, the branch condition contains symbolic variables and cannot be evaluated as true or false
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in isolation. Using symbolic execution, the algorithm evaluates both the true branch and the false
branch by executing σ.next conditioned on the condition evaluating to false (denoted [ execStep(σ) |
σ.next.cond 7→ false ] in line 428) and conditioned on the branch condition evaluating to true (432).
In each case, the constraints of the resulting state are checked for consistency (430, 434). If either
state is consistent, it is atomically placed onto QA (431, 435).
5.2.6 Algorithm summary
Let us return to Figure 5.3(b) from earlier, which depicts a node tree rooted at σn−1 during the
verification of msgn. The node colored white with a solid outline represents the root node with state
σn−1. The nodes colored white with dashed outlines, are the dead nodes and represent intermediate
states that no longer exist. A node is dead when it does not reach a success condition or exits the
main if block of VerifyWorker (starting on line 418) without generating any child nodes. Nodes
colored black are the active nodes and are currently being explored by worker threads. Nodes
colored dark gray are in the set Live. If there are worker threads that are ready to process a node,
the highest priority live nodes are in QR, otherwise live nodes and are either in the set Live. Nodes
colored light grey are the infant nodes and are in QA. We can see that worker W4 recently hit a
symbolic branch condition and created two child nodes which were added to QA. The other workers
are likely executing lines 420–422.
5.3 Multi-threaded KLEE
Supporting the algorithm described in the previous section requires a multi-threaded symbolic
execution engine. To our knowledge, no current symbolic execution engines support multi-threaded
execution in a single process. Since our previous verification tool was built upon klee, we modified
it to support multi-threaded execution. There were many small changes made to the code to make it
thread-safe, but some of the major changes include: making the internal reference count class thread
safe, tracking statistics with per-thread objects, adding critical sections around shared resources,
and creating separate solver stacks and memory allocators for each worker thread. As a side benefit,
this multi-threaded implementation of klee can be used outside of client verification and should
enable improved performance for other symbolic execution tasks.
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5.4 Evaluation
We now evaluate the performance of the parallel verification algorithm. Recall that by design,
our verification algorithm has no false positives — i.e., if a message trace is declared to be inconsistent
with the sanctioned client software, then it really is. The only source of false negatives arises from
the limited fidelity of the constraints used to model values returned by components with which
the client software interacts. In these experiments we make the assumption that the environment
modelling is sound. We limit our evaluation to legitimate message traces since our approach is
designed to quickly validate legal behavior in clients that have an unbounded number of execution
paths for exploration. However, there is no reason that a version of the parallel algorithm presented
in this chapter could not be applied to the exhaustive client verification problem from Chapter 3.
The experiments in this chapter use a multi-threaded version of our verification tool, built
upon KLEE version 1.0[17], LLVM 3.4[60] and STP (rev-940)[34]. The experiments were run on
system with 256GB of RAM and 32 3.2GHz processor cores. To evaluate performance, we applied
our parallel algorithm to verify behavior of legitimate clients of two open-source games from
our previous case studies, namely XPilot and TetriNET, which are described in previous chapters.
Evaluation of our parallel verification algorithm requires message traces for both training and
testing. For TetriNET, we generated 20 traces of manual gameplay, each of 240 messages in length
(which corresponds to roughly 6.5 minutes of gameplay). For XPilot, we generated 40 traces of
manual gameplay, each consisting of 2100 messages (roughly 70 seconds of gameplay). For our
experiments we use the same message traces and training data from the evaluation section from
Chapter 4. Note however that these experiments were performed on a system with a different CPU
that has a 10% higher clock rate.
For each client type, we ran three cross validation experiments over the message traces with
either 1, 8 or 16 worker threads. The training fragments were clustered with cluster parameter values
k = 3790 and k = 475 for TetriNET and XPilot, respectively. These parameters ensured a single
training fragment per cluster and corresponds to the “default” configuration used in Chapter 4.
These experiments do not include results using the “hint” configuration, because as we will see,
when using the parallel verification technique, client-side modification to provide hints to the
verifier is not necessary. Although the experiments in our evaluation use the same data, the single
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worker experiments in this chapter gain the benefits of separate threads for the NodeScheduler and
TrainingSelector procedures and the increased clock rate of our experiment platform.
In our evaluation we observe two data points for each msgn in a message trace, verification
cost and verification delay. The verification cost for message msgn, denoted cost(n), accounts for
all time spent in ParallelVerify(σn−1, msgn, Φ). This is measured as the wall-clock time that the
algorithm takes to determine that msgn is valid.2 Note that the verification time represents work
done concurrently and doesn’t represent the total summation of CPU time across multiple cores.
Our second data point for evaluation is the verification delay, which is the delay in time between
the arrival of message msgn at the server (where a server-to-client message “arrives” when it is
sent) and the discovery of an execution prefix Πn that is consistent with msg0, . . ., msgn. Delay
differs from verification time by representing the fact that verification for msgn cannot begin until
after verification for msgn−1 completes. The methods for calculating verification cost and delay are
formally defined in Section 4.7 of Chapter 4.
5.4.1 Case Study: TetriNET
Cost (s) Delay (s)
NumWorkers 16 8 1 16 8 1
Min 0.0007 0.0003 0.0001 0.0008 0.0003 0.0001
Max 12.1548 16.6219 100.8736 13.1708 22.7357 337.01
Median 0.0368 0.0370 0.0321 0.0489 0.0484 17.946
Mean 0.1287 0.1622 1.5859 0.3975 0.6361 57.137
Std. Dev. 0.7613 1.0367 8.8912 1.4841 2.3314 77.718
Figure 5.6. Summary statistics for TetriNET results
Figure 5.6 shows summary statistics for the parallel verification algorithm on the TetriNET
experiments and shows both verification costs and delays for 16-worker, 8-worker and 1-worker
configurations. These results were obtained by a 20-fold cross validation of the TetriNET traces; i.e.,
in each test, one of the traces was selected for testing, and the remainder were used for training.
Each row in Figure 5.6 is a measure of values (costs or delays) observed over all 20 experiments.
The mean verification cost per message, regardless of the number of threads used, is easily beneath
the inter-message delay of roughly 1.6s. As an optimization over results in Chapter 4, we can see
2If backtracking occurs, that time is included in the verification time of the associated message index, i.e., the verification
time for msgn may include the total wall clock time of more than one instance of ParallelVerify.
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that parallelization of the verification algorithm allows us to drop the mean verification cost from
1.59s using a single worker thread to 130ms when using the 16-thread configuration. If the verifier
was placed in-line, this might be an acceptable overhead on average to add to the processing of
network data. However the maximum verification time of 12.15s is greater than the average inter-
message delay of 1.6s and would not be an acceptable amount of latency to add to the client-server
communication. Looking at the Delay columns in Figure 5.6 we can see that the max delay is 25X
less in the 16-worker configuration than in the 1-worker configuration.
Figure 5.7 shows the distribution of verification cost per message, binned into ten-message bins,
across all 20 traces. The boxplot labeled “0” shows the distribution of verification times for messages
msg0, . . . ,msg9 in the 20 traces. In each boxplot, the “box” shows the first, second (median) and
third quartiles, and with whiskers extending to ±1.5 times the interquartile range. Additional
outlier points are shown as dots. Overlaid on each boxplot is a diamond (♦) that shows the average
of the data points. In Figure 5.7 we can see how additional worker threads reduce the verification
costs. We can also see that it is the outlier points that dominate the overall time spent in the verifier,
with bands at 90s, 14s and 10s for the three configurations. Comparing the 1-worker and 16-worker
configurations, the performance multiplier is roughly 9, rather than 16. Our implementation does
not achieve a “perfect” speed-up when adding additional workers and there are several factors
that may be at play. First, a single outlier can represent verification in multiple node trees due to
backtracking. Although 2.5% of TetriNET messages required backtracking, there is not a direct
correlation between existence of backtracking and higher verification cost. Nevertheless, a round
with backtracking cannot exploit multiple workers as efficiently as possible because early in the
exploration of a node tree because there are more fewer live nodes than workers available. Second,
there is some overhead in our implementation and as we add more threads there is a added cost to
access shared resources. We attempted to minimize this as much as possible in our design.
Figure 5.8 plots the distributions of per-message verification delay between the arrival of message
msgn at the server and the discovery of an execution prefix Πn that is consistent withmsg0, . . ., msgn.
Delay (Figure 5.8) differs from verification cost (Figure 5.7) by representing the fact that verification
for msgn cannot begin until after that for msgn−1 completes. So, for example, the rightmost boxplot
in each graph provides insight into how long after the completion of the message trace (in real
time) that it took for verification for the whole trace to complete. We note that for the multi worker
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configurations of 8 and 16 workers, verification is able to keep pace with gameplay and never
accumulates delay over the course of verification. The median of the rightmost boxplot is virtually
zero. Even if verification falls behind at some point in the game, it always catches up because of the
gap between message arrival times. This indicates that the verifier needs only a fixed sized buffer
of network messages to manage a long-running verification session. We see that in Figure 5.8c,
which shows the single worker configuration, verification delay lags behind message arrival times
by more than 60s by the end of a 240-message trace in the average case.
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Figure 5.7. TetriNET parallel verification costs. Cross-validation over 20 traces. Boxplot at x shows verification
costs for messages msgx, . . ., msgx+9 in each trace (after training on the other traces). “♦” shows the average.
98
0.0
4.6
9.2
13.8
18.4
23.0
0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 10
0
11
0
12
0
13
0
14
0
15
0
16
0
17
0
18
0
19
0
20
0
21
0
Message Bin
D
el
ay
 (s
)
(a) NumWorkers = 16
0.0
4.6
9.2
13.8
18.4
23.0
0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 10
0
11
0
12
0
13
0
14
0
15
0
16
0
17
0
18
0
19
0
20
0
21
0
Message Bin
D
el
ay
 (s
)
(b) NumWorkers = 8
0.0
67.6
135.2
202.8
270.4
338.0
0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 10
0
11
0
12
0
13
0
14
0
15
0
16
0
17
0
18
0
19
0
20
0
21
0
Message Bin
D
el
ay
 (s
)
(c) NumWorkers = 1
Figure 5.8. TetriNET parallel verification delays. Cross-validation over 20 traces. Boxplot at x shows verifica-
tion delays for messages msgx, . . ., msgx+9 in each trace (after training on the other traces). “♦” shows the
average.
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5.4.2 Case Study: XPilot
Cost (s) Delay (s)
NumWorkers 16 8 1 16 8 1
Min 0.0004 0.0004 0.0001 0.0025 0.0022 0.0023
Max 0.7071 0.4966 5.4948 1.1990 1.5294 122.85
Median 0.0164 0.0168 0.0122 0.0205 0.0250 29.869
Mean 0.0205 0.0213 0.0658 0.0754 0.0791 32.740
Std. Dev. 0.0237 0.0198 0.1364 0.1313 0.1248 24.187
Figure 5.9. Summary statistics for XPilot results
Figure 5.9 shows the summary statistics of the experiments on XPilot, for verification cost and
delay – using 16-worker, 8-worker and 1-worker configurations. XPilot poses a different challenge
than TetriNET for verification because the message rate is so fast. The tests described here use
an XPilot configuration that resulted in an average of 32 messages per second or an average inter-
message time of 31.5ms. Nevertheless, with our parallel verification technique, we can achieve a
mean verification cost of only 20ms and return a verification result in less than 0.71s for all messages
in our experiments. The multi-worker configurations are both more than 3× faster on average than
the single worker configuration. For the 16-worker configuration, the verifier is on average only
75ms behind (1.19s in the worst case), whereas when using only a single-worker, verification delay
is on average 32.7s and over 2 minutes in the worst case. These results demonstrate that in-line
verification is feasible and would add minimal latency in the average case. However, adding 1.19s
of latency in the worst case would not be acceptable for fast-paced gameplay.
In Figure 5.10, the verification costs for XPilot are shown for the three worker configurations
across the message traces. Each boxplot in Figure 5.10 represents 100 × 40 points. Despite a
mean verification cost of 75ms when using a single worker thread, the fast pace of XPilot makes
it difficult for verification to keep pace with the game. This effect is shown in Figure 5.11(c).
However, by increasing the number of worker threads, we can see that in the 16-worker and 8-
worker configurations, verification delay never significantly falls behind and could use only a fixed
buffer of messages for verification in long running sessions.
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Figure 5.10. XPilot parallel verification costs. Cross-validation over 40 traces. Boxplot at x shows verification
costs for messages msgx, . . ., msgx+99 in each trace (after training on the other traces). “♦” shows the average.
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Figure 5.11. XPilot parallel verification delays. Cross-validation over 40 traces. Boxplot at x shows verification
delays for messagesmsgx, . . .,msgx+99 in each trace (after training on the other traces). “♦” shows the average.
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Cost(s)
with without
TrainingSelector TrainingSelector
thread thread
Min 0.0003 0.0003
Max 16.0291 17.1220
Median 0.0349 0.0221
Mean 0.1804 0.1833
Std.Dev. 1.0507 1.2745
(a) TetriNET
Cost(s)
with without
TrainingSelector TrainingSelector
thread thread
Min 0.0007 0.0006
Max 0.4312 0.4469
Median 0.0158 0.0157
Mean 0.0170 0.0172
Std.Dev. 0.0184 0.0182
(b) XPilot
Figure 5.12. Summary of verification cost in seconds for TetriNET and XPilot, with and without a
TrainingSelector thread, using NumWorkers = 8.
5.4.3 Evaluation of NodeScheduler and TrainingSelector Threads
The parallel algorithm presented in this chapter divides and distributes the verification com-
putation into separate threads across multiple CPU cores. Recall in addition to a variable number
of VerifyWorker threads, the algorithm uses two additional threads; one for the NodeScheduler pro-
cedure (Figure 5.5) and one for the TrainingSelector procedure (detailed in Chapter 4). In this
section, we will examine the performance impact of computing the work done by the procedures
NodeScheduler and TrainingSelector in separate threads as opposed to an alternative arrangement
where the work is divided amongst all VerifyWorker threads.
In our current experiments and implementation, the usage of a NodeScheduler thread does not
provide a measurable performance benefit. The increased granularity of the workload is offset by
the small overhead of the implementation. Nevertheless, this design provides a cleaner separation
of work for the implementation and we predict verification of different client software in the future
may benefit from the architecture.
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Using a separate thread for the TrainingSelector procedure does however have a measurable
performance impact. The procedure TrainingSelector is provided a network message msgn and a set
of execution fragments Φ, produced during training and returns a subset of execution fragments Φn,
used by the NodeScheduler to inform node selection. The details of the TrainingSelector algorithm
are described in Chapter 4. In our experimental results thus far, each thread has exclusive access to
a CPU core. However, the algorithm is designed so that the TrainingSelector method can be called
synchronously by removing spawn on Line 307 of the ParallelVerify procedure in Figure 5.4. We
evaluated this design decision on the case studies XPilot and TetriNET with a new experimental
setup where the TrainingSelector procedure is called synchronously before the VerifyWorker threads
are spawned. Figure 5.12 shows a summary of the verification costs in seconds for the case studies
using NumWorkers = 8. The mean verification cost in seconds increases measurably for both XPilot
and TetriNET when the verifier is executed without a TrainingSelector thread.
5.5 Evaluation of Optimization Techniques
The performance of parallel symbolic verification is dependent on many factors. We have
shown that a parallel implementation with multiple worker threads decreases the cost of verifica-
tion over the single-threaded implementation outlined in the previous chapters. Using symbolic
execution as the basis for a verification method has required several optimizations to the underlying
implementation, which have been described in previous chapters. In this section we review these
optimization techniques and evaluate their impact and interaction with parallel symbolic execution
in our case studies.
Several optimization methods were developed and utilized to improve the performance of
symbolic execution for verification. klee was designed with techniques for reducing the size
and number of queries that are sent to the underlying constraint solver. One of these techniques
is a cache of solver queries and their respective solver outputs. Before a constraint formula or
query is tested for satisfiability via stp, klee checks a query cache and if the cache contains a hit,
the potentially expensive solver operation can be avoided. If there is a miss, the solver must be
instantiated and the result is added to the cache afterwards. In our implementation, each worker
thread operates a separate solver chain, which means that klee query caches are not shared between
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workers. Additionally, the caches are empty upon starting verification of a message sequence. In
the previous chapters, two methods have been demonstrated that enable better utilization of these
caches: canonicalization (Section 4.7.1) and constraint pruning (Section 3.2.3). The canonicalization
method is used to rewrite the variable names in a solver query before the query cache is checked.
The constraint pruning optimization is used to eliminate variables and formula constructs that have
not been concretized but can be shown to never be relevant to future branch conditions; variables
can be pruned that are no longer in the scope of execution and are independent from the current
scope.
In this section we evaluate the impact and interactions of parallel symbolic verification with
and without the canonicalization and constraint pruning optimizations. The experiment operates
with the verifier in three configurations. The first configuration, which we call AllOpt, is the same
configuration used in Section 5.4, and utilizes both canonicalization and constraint pruning. The
second configuration, NoCanon, is the same as the former but disables the canonicalization of queries
before the query cache is checked. The third and final configuration, NoPrune, is the same as AllOpt
but with constraint pruning disabled. Additionally, we are only verifying a single game play log
from each of our case studies, XPilot and TetriNET. Despite using a single log, the experimental
results are representative of the full case study data sets. The use of a single log allows easier
characterization of the interactions of the optimizations with symbolic client verification. All of
the experiments were performed with NumWorkers = 16. If the experiments are configured with
NumWorkers = 1, disabling canonicalization or constraint pruning causes the verification to take
several hours. In addition to demonstrating the benefit of constraint pruning and canonicalization,
these results are also useful to characterize the workloads of our case studies in terms of the symbolic
execution optimizations of klee and may be of use to others.
5.5.1 Impact of Optimizations on Cost and Delay
We now examine the performance interactions of canonicalization and constraint pruning
with parallel symbolic verification. We start with an experiment to determine the impact of these
optimizations on our key evaluation metrics, cost and delay. Figure 5.13 shows an overview of
the cost and delay times per message during the verification of a single game play trace from the
TetriNET and XPilot case studies. In Figure 5.13(a) we can see that for TetriNET, either disabling
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Cost (s) Delay (s)
AllOpt NoCanon NoPrune AllOpt NoCanon NoPrune
Min 0.0016 0.0014 0.0013 0.0016 0.0014 0.0013
Max 1.4875 3.3591 4.7334 1.4925 3.3690 4.7390
Median 0.0384 0.0376 0.0760 0.0504 0.0467 0.1281
Mean 0.0835 0.0986 0.2214 0.1387 0.1919 0.4207
Std. Dev. 0.1970 0.3225 0.5242 0.2655 0.5062 0.7522
(a) TetriNET
Cost (s) Delay (s)
AllOpt NoCanon NoPrune AllOpt NoCanon NoPrune
Min 0.0009 0.0007 0.0009 0.0027 0.0086 0.0090
Max 0.6268 0.7627 8.2392 1.1417 55.0549 1158.8995
Median 0.0171 0.0327 0.3217 0.0266 35.5776 421.1561
Mean 0.0198 0.0559 0.6080 0.1084 29.5545 537.8276
Std. Dev. 0.0256 0.1213 0.7888 0.2019 16.8834 410.7422
(b) XPilot
Figure 5.13. Verification costs and delays for TetriNET and XPilot for a single representative log.
the canonicalization optimization (NoCanon) or disabling the constraint pruning optimization
(NoPrune) adversely affects the mean values for cost and delay. The benefit of these optimizations
is even more prevalent in the XPilot results shown in Figure 5.13(b). Disabling canonicalization
increases the mean verification cost by a factor of five and due to the rapid rate at which XPilot
messages are transmitted, disabling canonicalization introduces more than a 200× increase in the
mean verification delay. Also, for XPilot, constraint pruning is even more important for efficient
verification; the mean verification delay increases from roughly a 0.10 seconds with all optimizations
to over 8 minutes without constraint pruning.
5.5.2 Impact of Optimizations on Solver Queries
We can better understand how the canonicalization and constraint pruning optimizations
impact cost and delay in parallel symbolic verification by looking at how these optimizations change
the properties of the formulas sent as queries to the constraint solver (stp).
Query Cache Hit Rate
Figure 5.14 shows the overall hit rates of the query cache in the single log verification experiment
and can begin to explain why the optimizations make verification more efficient. With all opti-
mizations (AllOpt), both TetriNET and XPilot have high hit rates of 99.89% and 97.13% respectively.
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TetriNET XPilot
AllOpt 0.9989 0.9713
NoCanon 0.6860 0.3326
NoPrune 0.9989 0.9618
Figure 5.14. Overall query cache hit rates for a single log selected from each of the TetriNET and XPilot case
studies.
In other words, of all queries to the constraint solver stack, less than 0.12% and 3.87% (TetriNET
and XPilot, respectively) actually result in a potentially expensive call to to the constraint solver
stp. Without the canonicalization optimization (NoCanon), the effectiveness of the cache is reduced
significantly for TetriNET and even more so for XPilot, dropping the hit rate to 33.26%.
Canonicalization has a large impact on the query cache hit rate because it reduces the space
of variable names that can be found in the constraint cache. During verification, when a symbolic
variable is generated (e.g., to represent an unknown user input value), in addition to representing a
region of memory, the variable is given a unique name. The symbolic variable name may be used
in a formula to represent any constraints on any associated symbolic memory region. Verification
in our case studies often generates constraints that have the same formula structure, but with
different variable names. By canonicalizing the variable names before the query cache is utilized,
the chance of a cache hit becomes much more likely and the expensive constraint solver query can
be avoided. The need for canonicalization highlights a key difference between the use of symbolic
execution for client verification versus more traditional uses of symbolic execution; client verification
exercises the same paths repeatedly but with slightly different contexts. Unlike canonicalization,
constraint pruning does not significantly improve the cache hit rate for the case studies; the NoPrune
experiment shows the same hit rate for TetriNET and only slightly lower hit rate for XPilot.
Query Cache Hit Rate Per Message
Figure 5.15 shows the same cache hit rate values shown in Figure 5.14 but per message. Figure 5.15
illustrates the change in the query cache hit rate as verification progresses through the message log
as well as the volume of cache accesses needed to verify each message. The query cache hit rate is
shown on the y-axis and the message index on the x-axis. Each plotted dot represents the effective
hit rate of the query cache over all queries during the creation of Πn from Πn−1. The number of
cache accesses needed to construct each Πn is represented exactly by the area of each circle. The
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Figure 5.15. Query cache hit rates per message for the verification of a single representative game play log
from each of the case studies. The area of each circle is scaled relative to the number of cache accesses
represented.
legend shows several example circle areas and the corresponding number of cache accesses each
area represents. The three configuration types are indicated on the right side of each plot.
Figure 5.15(a) shows the TetriNET experiment. The AllOpt and NoPrune results are very similar;
after verification of a few messages, the query cache contains enough entries to produce a very high
cache hit rate. However for the NoCanon configuration, we can observe that without canonicalization
the query cache does not contain entries that match the formulas with new variables names and is
not effective, even towards the end of the message log.
The XPilot results are shown in Figure 5.15(b). The AllOpt configuration for XPilot shows that
verification proceeds for around 30 messages before the cache hit rate improves significantly. The
NoPrune configuration is similar, but with intermittent poor performance due to the disabling of
constraint pruning. Additionally, noticeable bands appear in the results because of the variety
of message types. The NoCanon plot for XPilot shows the significance of the canonicalization
optimization, both the query cache hit rate and the volume of cache accesses are affected with
negative impacts on performance.
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Figure 5.16. The cumulative number query cache hits over the verification of a single game play log from
XPilot and TetriNET.
Cumulative Query Cache Hits and Solver Queries
We now examine how the query cache is exercised by the three configurations in terms of the
cumulative number of hits in the query cache and the cumulative number of misses that lead to
actual calls to the constraint solver. Figure 5.16 shows the cumulative number of query cache hits
for TetriNET and XPilot over the verification of a single representative game play log. By the time
the last message is verified, the TetriNET experiment results in over 80, 000 cache hits amongst the
16 worker threads, while the XPilot experiment generates over 100, 000 cache hits. The cumulative
number of final cache hits is about the same for each configuration of TetriNET. However for XPilot
there is a significant difference; the NoPrune configuration has approximately twice as many query
cache hits as NoCanon. The NoPrune configuration produced more cache hits overall, even more
than AllOpt, because the overall search was less efficient and interacted with the parallel verification.
Under NoPrune, each verify worker has a more complex workload with larger constraints and
therefore the time to discover the correct execution prefix increases. The additional time needed
allows other worker threads to search additional paths, thus increasing the number of query cache
hits. This aligns with the results for the NoPrune configuration in Figure 5.15(b); the relative query
cache hit rate is slightly less than AllOpt, but the overall number of cache accesses (indicated by the
size of the circles) is larger.
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Figure 5.17. The cumulative number of queries to the solver (stp) over the verification of a single game play
log from XPilot and TetriNET.
A query is only made to the constraint solver after a query cache miss has occurred. Therefore,
the number of misses in the caches is exactly equal to the number of actual queries made to the
constraint solver. Figure 5.17 shows the cumulative number of queries to the constraint solver
(stp) over the verification of single game log for both TetriNET and XPilot using the three different
configurations. Here it is very evident that for both case studies, the canonicalization optimization
significantly reduces the overall number of expensive queries to stp. If we combine the overall
numbers for TetriNET from Figure 5.17(a) and Figure 5.16(a), we can see that NoCanon had a
significantly greater number of solver queries, including queries resulting in a cache hit. Again, this
is due to an interaction with workers operating in parallel; the time to discover a valid execution
prefix increases when more time is spent in the constraint solver. Therefore, other worker threads
explore additional paths, leading to a greater number of client instructions executed across all
worker threads. The impact of this interaction is examined further in the next section (5.5.3).
Complexity of Solver Queries
In addition to the number of queries to the constraint solver, we also characterize the complexity
of these queries in terms of the size of the queried constraint. A constraint formula consists of binary
and unary operators on variables or concrete values; each of those operators is counted as a single
construct. The metric we use for size is a measure that corresponds to the number constructs in the
query. Each circle plotted in Figure 5.18 summarizes the complexity of the constraint formulas sent
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Figure 5.18. Average query construct count per message verified in a single representative game play log from
TetriNET and XPilot. The area of each circle is scaled relative to the number of solver queries represented.
to the solver by showing the average number of constructs in the solver queries during the creation
of Πn from Πn−1. Additionally, the area of each circle represents the number of queries sent to the
constraint solver. Note that the data shown in Figure 5.18 characterizes the query formulas sent to
the constraint solver (STP) after a query cache miss has occurred.
As we have seen, the lack of canonicalization leads to poor cache utilization; the effects of which
are twofold for the NoCanon configuration in Figure 5.18(a). First, the average query construct count
(on the y-axis) is greater than AllOpt across the message sequence. Without canonicalization, fewer
queries are located in the query cache and thus more queries are sent to the constraint solver and
these queries have a greater query construct count. Second, the total number of queries is greater
(area of circles) because poor cache utilization leads to a greater number of client instructions
executed; this is examined further in the next section (5.5.3).
The XPilot experiment in Figure 5.18(b) reveals similar results for the NoCanon configuration.
The average query construct count (on the y-axis) is greater than AllOpt across the message sequence
because larger queries are not located in the cache and the total number of queries is larger (area of
circles) because a greater number of client instructions are executed. In the NoPrune configuration,
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there is a behavior where the average number of constructs increases with each creation of Πn from
Πn−1, with a periodic “reset” of the average constraint complexity. This behavior is seen when
constraint pruning is disabled because independent constraints that contain symbolic variables
that are generated for Πn, may have a relationship with a symbolic variable generated during the
creation of Πn−1. For example, suppose a symbolic variable represents the current time and is fully
symbolic. This variable will be strictly greater than a similar variable that represents an earlier
instance of the time. These constraints do not grow throughout the entire gameplay session because
of high level game events that cause, for example, a reset of certain game state values. By using the
constraint pruning techniques that are described in the previous chapter, the complexity of solver
queries can be dramatically reduced and can be seen clearly in Figure 5.18(b) by comparing AllOpt
and NoPrune.
5.5.3 Impact of Optimizations on Instructions Executed and Memory Usage
We now examine the impact of canonicalization and constraint pruning on two additional
performance metrics in the verifier. The number of client instructions executed during symbolic
execution by the verifier and the memory utilization of the verifier.
The number of client instructions executed characterizes the work done by the symbolic exe-
cution component of the verifier. The lower bound on the number of client instructions executed
up to verification of message n is the length of the execution prefix Πn. In practice though, the
number of client instructions executed by the verifier is much greater than the lower bound. In fact,
achieving this lower bound is likely not possible without knowledge of the remote client state and
remote user inputs. A key objective in the design of our verifier was to reduce the total number
of client instructions executed during the creation of Πn from Πn−1, thus lowering the verification
cost. Chapter 4 outlines techniques to reduce the number of client instructions executed using edit
distance based node selection and training data. Executing client instructions is not, however, the
only work of the verifier. Figure 4.5 in Chapter 4 gives a high-level view of the time spent in each
component of the verifier and shows that a significant percentage of the verifier’s computation is
spent doing work other than executing instructions, e.g., solving constraints. Canonicalization and
constraint pruning do not directly affect the number of client instructions executed, but may decrease
the time of constraint solving. In fact, when the verifier is configured with NumWorkers = 1, under
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Figure 5.19. Cumulative number of client instructions executed per message during during verification of a
single representative game play log from the TetriNET and XPilot case studies.
each of the configurations AllOpt, NoCanon and NoPrune, the verifier will execute the exact same
number of client instructions. However, when NumWorkers > 1, any change to the performance of
the verifier can affect the total number of client instructions executed amongst the verify worker
threads. The interaction between the performance of constraint solving and the total number
of client instructions executed is complex. For example, by decreasing the time spent constraint
solving, nodes may be “revealed” more quickly in the node tree, leading to quicker utilization
of all VerifyWorker threads, and therefore a greater number of instructions executed. Conversely,
more expensive constraint solving may also lead to an increased number of client instructions
executed. This is because if the time taken to create Πn by one VerifyWorker thread is increased,
other VerifyWorker threads may execute additional client instructions. Another important point
regarding the relationship between verification cost and client instructions executed is that when
the verifier is configured with NumWorkers > 1, verification costs should be lower than a verifier
configured with NumWorkers = 1, as seen in our earlier evaluation, despite potentially executing a
greater number of client instructions.
Figure 5.19 shows the cumulative number of client instructions executed over the verification of
a single representative game play log from TetriNET and XPilot under the three configurations. In
the AllOpt configuration, for TetriNET and XPilot, the total number of client instructions executed is
2.7× 108 and 1.9× 108 respectively. As before, the verifier was configured with NumWorkers = 16
for these results.
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Figure 5.20. Cumulative overall memory utilization in gigabytes during verification of a single representative
game play log for the TetriNET and XPilot case studies.
The TetriNET client contains more possible execution paths than the XPilot client; therefore
worker utilization is high when a message is verified. With high worker utilization, disabling
canonicalization or constraint pruning increases the overall cost of executing a client instruction on
average and sometimes decreases the total number of client instructions executed. This explains
the regions in Figure 5.19(a), where the NoCanon or NoPrune lines are below the AllOpt line. During
verification of the XPilot client, utilization of the VerifyWorker threads is not always 100%, therefore
in the NoCanon and NoPrune configurations, the increased verification cost of a single message
enables better utilization of all VerifyWorker threads. Better thread utilization allows exploration of
additional paths and execution of additional client instructions. Figure 5.19(b) shows the increase
in cumulative client instructions executed for NoCanon and NoPrune. If more client instructions are
executed, there is a corresponding increase in the number of solver queries, which helps explain
why disabling canonicalization and constraint pruning led to an increase in the number of cache
hits and solver queries seen in Figure 5.16 and Figure 5.17.
5.6 Summary
In this chapter we described a parallel client verification algorithm that vastly reduces verifi-
cation costs for our case study applications, XPilot and TetriNET. Improving the verification cost
using a parallel algorithm pays large dividends when accumulated over time; in some cases the
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delays drop from 2 minutes to less than 2 seconds. To achieve these results, we designed and
implemented a multi-threaded client verification algorithm that uses multiple threads to enable
concurrent exploration of execution paths. These results open the door to using symbolic client
verification on the critical path of serving client requests and could provide a new method for
preventing malicious clients from disrupting gameplay and damaging server infrastructure.
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CHAPTER 6: CONCLUSION
We have presented a technique to detect any type of malicious behavior that causes a remote
client to exhibit behavior, as seen by the server, that is inconsistent with the sanctioned client
software and the client state known at the server. Our technique discerns whether there was any
possible sequence of user inputs to the sanctioned client software that could have given rise to each
message received at the server, given what the server knew about the client based on previous
messages from the client and the messages the server sent to the client. In doing so, our approach
remedies the previously heuristic and manual construction of server-side checks. We have also
presented a verification technique that validates legitimate client behavior (as being consistent
with the sanctioned client software) sufficiently fast to keep pace with the application itself as
demonstrated in two case studies in the context of online games. The parallel implementation
of symbolic client verification could be used to prevent malicious messages from ever reaching a
vulnerable server if used to verify client messages before they are processed. Our technique for
verification operates without encumbering the application with substantially more bandwidth use
and without sacrificing accuracy.
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